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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In this Article, Professors Ceci and Friedman analyze psychological
studies on children's suggestibility and find a broad consensus that young
children are suggestible to a significant degree. Studies confirm that inter-
viewers commonly use suggestive interviewing techniques that exacerbate this
suggestibility, creating a significant risk in some forensic contexts-notably
but not exclusively those of suspected child abuse-that children will make
false assertions of fact. Professors Ceci and Friedman address the implica-
tions of this difficulty for the legal system and respond to Professor Lyon's
criticism of this view recently articulated in the Cornell Law Review. Us-
ing Bayesian probability theory, Professors Ceci and Friedman assess the im-
plications of children's suggestibility for factfinding in adjudication. Based
on the constitutionally compelled principle that an inaccurate criminal con-
viction is afar worse result than a failure to gain an accurate conviction,
even a slight risk of false allegations is signfficant. Professors Ceci and
Friedman present several policy implications that follow from their analysis.
First, interviewers should use leading questions only as a last resort, and they
should completely avoid some strongly suggestive techniques that create par-
ticularly significant risks offalse allegation. Second, except in very limited
circumstances the fact that a child has been subjected to suggestive question-
ing should not preclude her from testifying. Instead, in appropriate cases,
courts should be receptive to expert evidence on the suggestibility of children.
Furthermore, in some extreme cases in which the child's allegation is essential
to the prosecution and the child was subjected to very strongly suggestive
influences, a criminal conviction should be precluded. To the extent that
reliability is a factor in determining the admissibility of hearsay statements,
in some circumstances children's statements should be considered unreliable.
Finally, absent exigent circumstances, all interviews conducted as part of a
criminal abuse investigation should be videotaped, to reduce the uncertainty
as to whether interviewers have used suggestive questioning techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Young children have historically been viewed as particularly vul-
nerable to suggestion. Within the mainstream scientific community,
scholars agree that young children are more susceptible than older
individuals to leading questions and pressures to conform to the ex-
pectations and desires of others. At the same time, children may hesi-
tate to disclose matters such as sexual abuse without significant
prompting. In some circumstances, these frailties aggravate the al-
ready difficult task of determining whether a child's statement is
truthful. This matter is of immense concem because of the large
number of young children who are interviewed each year during the
course of abuse and neglect investigations.' The vulnerabilities of
I In each of the past three years there have been approximately two million reports
alleging the maltreatment of nearly three million children. Among the forty-nine states
reporting to the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect 1997 data system, there were
126,095 cases of substantiated sexual abuse of minors-or nearly 13% of all reported cases
[Vol. 86:3"3
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young children have far-reaching implications for the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. Arguably, these vulnerabilities may affect
how an investigator should interview the child; whether she should be
allowed to testify in court; whether her hearsay statements should be
admitted; whether expert evidence concerning her vulnerability
should be admitted; and whether a criminal conviction based princi-
pally on her testimony should be allowed.
Recently, however, a number of scholars-most notablyJohn E.B.
Myers and Thomas D. Lyon on this side of the Atlantic-have vigor-
ously criticized this mainstream view.2 These scholars have chastised
scientific researchers for fueling what they deem to be a backlash
against believing children's claims of abuse. They believe that for at
least two reasons the results of the scientific research have little bear-
ing on the real world. First, they argue that there is scant empirical
evidence to support the assumption that child-abuse interviewers
often employ highly suggestive interviewing techniques that are po-
tentially damaging to the accuracy of children's statements.3 Second,
and 37% of all sexual abuse allegations. Although only a fraction of these children actually
testified in criminal court, virtually all of them were interviewed by law enforcement offi-
cials and/or child protective senvice workers, and many gave depositions or unswom testi-
mony. The most recent national incidence data make clear that young children are at least
as likely to be sexually abused as older children:
Age range Incidence (Cases per 1,000)
3-5 5.1
6-8 3.2
9-11 3.7
12-14 2.6
15-17 2.7
AiNpEAJ. SF.DLA & DLANE D. BROADHURsr, U.S. DiP'T OF HF..m & Hu.Lu, SEiws, TE
Tamw NATIONAL INcIDENcE STUDY OF CHILD ABusE AND NEGLEcr. Fni.u. RErorrr 4-13 fig.4-6
(1996). Across all reports of sexual abuse, children aged seven and younger comprise
40.65% of cases.
To this evidence, we can add the data from a recent government report: "When vic-
tims are grouped in 4-year age categories, those 4-7 years old were the highest proportion
of victims (26.2 percent)." U.S. Dm'T oF HEALuz AND Hu.w% SERvs., CHILD MALTP.ErT-
wurr 1997: REPoRms FROM THE STATES TO THE NAIoNAL CILD Anus A,,D NEGLErt DxA
Sys-rmi 4-2 (1999). If one adds to the above data children embroiled in acrimonious cus-
tody disputes, PINS (Persons in Need of Supervision) actions, neglect proceedings, and
termination of parental rights suits, then the absolute numbers of young children en-
meshed in the justice system is very large.
2 See Thomas D. Lyon, False Allegations and False Denials in Child Sexual Abuse, 1
PSYCHOL PuB. POL'Y & L. 429 (1995); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggesti-
bility Research: A Critique, 84 CoRNE.t L. REv. 1004 (1999) [hereinafter Lyon, Neu? lWte];
John E. B. Myers, New Era Of Skepticism Regarding Children's Credibility, 1 PsyCtio. PuB. PoLt'v
& L 387 (1995) [hereinafter Myers, New Era]; John E.B. Myers et al., Psyhlogical Research
on Children as 1itnesses: Practical mplicationsforForensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28
PAc. L.J. 3 (1996) [hereinafter Myers et al., Psdiological Resard]; Helen Westcott, Book
Review, 89 Burr.J. PSYCHOL 525 (1998).
3 See Myers, New Era, supra note 2, at 396. Myers explains that:
The reader comes away from Ced and Bruck's articles with the impres-
sion that many, if not most, intervieus are conducted improperly ....
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they argue that these techniques, even if commonly used in interviews,
would not result in suggestibility errors of the magnitude that scien-
tific studies suggest. Those studies "neglect[ ] the characteristics of
child sexual abuse that both make false allegations less likely and in-
crease the need to guard against a failure to detect abuse when it has
actually occurred."4
In this Article, we summarize and analyze the principal findings
of psychological research concerning children's suggestibility as well
as other factors that may affect the credibility of a child's allegation of
abuse. We demonstrate that what Lyon characterizes as a "new wave"
of research5 is actually a broad and long-standing scientific main-
stream. We argue that the results of this research do, indeed, raise
significant concerns for the real world of abuse and abuse investiga-
tion and thus engender significant legal implications.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the history and current state
of research into children's suggestibility. In this Part, we argue that,
although psychological researchers disagree considerably over the de-
gree to which the suggestibility of young children may lead to false
allegations of sexual abuse, there is an overwhelming consensus that
children are suggestible to a degree that, we believe, must be regarded
as significant. In presenting this argument, we respond to the conten-
tions of revisionist scholars, particularly those recently expressed by
Professor Lyon in the Cornell Law Review.6 We show that there is good
reason to believe the use of highly suggestive questions remains very
common, and that these questions present a significant possibility that
children will make false allegations even on matters such as sexual
abuse.
Part II develops a framework, using Bayesian probability theory,
for considering the findings described in Part I. We argue that there
is merit to the traditional-and constitutionally compelled-view that
If Ceci and Bruck supported their assertions with sufficient evidence,
they would have to be taken seriously. However, they fail to support their
indictment of investigative interviewing and children's credibility ...
[T] heir articles convey an unnecessarily pessimistic picture of the child pro-
tection system and children's credibility.
... In the final analysis, the articles [by Ceci and Bruck] fuel unwar-
ranted skepticism of children and the system designed to protect them.
Id.
4 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1004.
5 Lyon describes the "new wave" as a:
prestigious group of researchers in developmental psychology who argue
that children are highly vulnerable to suggestive interviewing techniques.
Because of its scientific credentials, its moderate tone, and its impressive
body of research, the new wave presents a serious challenge to those who
have claimed that children are unlikely to allege sexual abuse falsely.
6 Id.
[Vol. 86:33
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an inaccurate criminal conviction is a far worse result than a failure to
reach an accurate conviction, and that this perspective should inform
the design of legal systems. With this in mind, we explain that even
relatively slight probabilities of false allegations are potentially signifi-
cant. Moreover, we show that the very substantial probability that a
child who has been abused will fail to reveal the abuse tends, perhaps
counter-intuitively, to diminish the probative value of an allegation of
abuse when it is actually made.
Part I discusses the legal implications of our analysis. We con-
clude, in line with a rather broad consensus, that leading questions
should be used in interviewing children only as a last resort, and
stronger suggestive techniques should be avoided altogether. How-
ever, we express doubt about emerging legal doctrine that would pre-
clude a child from testifying if she had been exposed to unduly
suggestive questioning. We contend that, in some circumstances, the
admissibility of children's hearsay statements cannot be justified on
the basis that such statements are particularly reliable. We believe
that courts should be receptive in appropriate cases to expert evi-
dence on the suggestibility of children, and that in some cases doubts
about the credibility of the child should preclude a criminal convic-
tion. We also show that the array of responses to the suggestibility
problem available to the legal system substantially diminishes the sig-
nificance of the issue of how common suggestive questioning is in
abuse cases. The court can and should tailor its decisions to the case
at hand without worrying about whether the case is typical or not. As
an aid to that end, we recommend the videotaping of all interviews of
children that are conducted as part of investigations of suspected
abuse.
We agree with Lyon that "no science is value-free." 7 He himself
acknowledges that "an acute awareness of true cases of abuse and the
difficulty abused children have in revealing abuse" affects his analysis.,
We share this awareness, and we believe we appreciate the grievous
harm that can be wrought by child sexual abuse. Moreover, because
some scholars have suggested that Ceci has been grudging in his rec-
ognition of children's testimonial strengths,9 we emphasize our belief
that when children allege that they have been subjected to sexual
abuse they are frequently, even usually, accurate. As Ceci and Bruck
have written, "Children have enormous strengths in recollecting their
7 Id. at 1084. Ceci has expressed the same thought elsewhere. StephenJ. Ccci et al.,
Human Subjects Review, Personal Values, and the Regulalion of Sodal Sience R&saarh, 40 ANt.
PsYCHoL 994, 1001 (1985).
8 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1014.
9 Myers, NewEra, supra note 2, at 396; Westcott, supra note 2, at 527 (speaking of Ceci
and Bruck's supposed "almost exclusive focus on children's ieaknessesC and relative inat-
tention to "children's strength as witnesses"); supra note 3.
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past. Even very young preschool children are capable of providing
highly detailed and accurate accounts of prior interactions, provided
that the adults who have access to them do not do anything to usurp
their memories."10 We believe, and Ceci has written, that there are
probably many more unreported cases of child sexual abuse than false
allegations of abuse, and this is a most serious problem." We are con-
fident that fair-minded readers of this Article will not conclude that
we are biased against child witnesses. Indeed, some of our recommen-
dations have been met with a cold blast of fury from defense lawyers.
At the same time, we share with our legal system an abhorrence
of convicting a person for a crime he did not commit, whether the
crime is child sexual abuse or, say, assault, kidnaping, rape, or mur-
der. False convictions are an ever-present possibility, partly as a result
of the suggestive techniques that are sometimes used to investigate
abuse. In earlier times, many adults were executed because of chil-
dren's statements.' 2 Some of the suggestive factors used then to coax
children's disclosures remain in operation today. Society must be ever
10 Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Children s Testimony: Applied and Basic Issues, in 4
HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY. CHILD PSYcHoLocY IN PRAcaricE 713 (William Damon
ed., Irving E. Sigel & Y. Ann Renninger vol. eds., 5th ed. 1998) (emphasis removed).
11 See STEPHEN J. CcI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTRooM: A ScIErrlFIc
ANALYsIs OF CHILDREN'S TsTnIMoNY 24 (1995) ("Although there is some debate over the
exact prevalence of child sexual abuse in North America, the existing data lead us to be-
lieve that the incidence data most certainly underestimate the number of annual cases of
sexual abuse."). Ceci and Bruck elaborate:
We recoil at an earlier generation's denial of the magnitude of the problem
that exists at all levels of society and at rates that are so high as to call into
question some basic assumptions that we hold about ourselves as a people
and about the inherently healthy status of the American family....
[A]Ithough false claims exist, and perhaps in nontrivial numbers, we also
believe that, in absolute numbers, the incidence of sexual abuse is very
large and must never be minimized.
Id. at 4.
12 In Sweden, a great witch panic occurred between 1668 and 1676. See Rickard L.
Sj6berg, Child Testimonies During an Outbreak of Witch Hysteria: Sweden 1670-1671, 36J, CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PsYcHIrATY 1040 (1995). Village priests interviewed approximately 600 chil-
dren about the presumed sorcery of neighbors. Id. As a result of the children's state-
ments, fourteen adults in one community were burned at the stake, and in another
community twenty-seven adults were either beheaded or burned at the stake. Id.
In America, the most notorious witch trials occurred in Salem, Massachusetts during
the final decade of the seventeenth century. CECI & BRucE, supra note 11, at 8. A group of
children known as the "circle girls" testified that they witnessed the following: the defend-
ants flying on broom sticks, celestial apparitions in the form of speaking animals, and the
defendants instructing insects to fly into their mouths and deposit bent nails and pins In
their stomachs. Id. at 8-9. Ceci and Bruck relate that:
On the basis of [this] testimony, 19 defendants were convicted and put to
death, and a dozen more were spared execution when they threw them-
selves on the mercy of the court and admitted their participation in witch-
craft. In the aftermath of these executions, some of the child witnesses
publicly recanted their testimonies.
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vigilant to prevent the occurrence of a modem counterpart of such
tragedies.13
I
SuGGESTBn=T RESFARCH iN HisroRcAL PERSPECa'vE
We begin with a very brief history of research on children's sug-
gestibility.14 We will show that although there are obviously disagree-
ments among researchers, there is also a substantial degree of
consensus. To a large extent, the disagreements focus on which as-
pects of the data warrant emphasis. The so-called "new wave" is actu-
ally part of a very old and dominant view.
A. Early Studies
Scientific researchers have examined the question of children's
testimonial competence for more than a century.'' The work of the
renowned French psychologist Alfred Binet offers a useful perspective
for an overview of the early research.Y6 Later studies have echoed sev-
eral of his conclusions.
First, Binet concluded that, although older children and even
adults are suggestible to a significant degree,1 7 young children are
more highly suggestible.' 8 He argued that this suggestibility reflects
13 The authorship of this Article is rather unusual. One of us, Ccci, is a psychological
researcher, who for nearly two decades has examined the question of children's suggesti-
bility. He is one of three scholars whom Lyon identifies as being at the forefront of the
"new wave" of suggestibility research. Lyon, New ive, supra note 2, at 1010. The other
author of this Article, Friedman, is a legal academic who writes on e.idence law, among
other areas. Neither of us claims any expertise in the field of the other. We havejoined in
this collaboration, however, because we believe it may be productive in leading to a better
understanding of how the current state of knowledge of children's capacities and vulnera-
bilities should affect the operation of the legal system. We have both participated in writ-
ing the entire Article (the order of authorship is alphabetical only), and we are both
comfortable with its entire contents. But neither of us presumes to offer evaluations or
make recommendations outside the bounds of our own expertise; when we step beyond
those bounds, we are each relying on our coauthor.
14 For fuller historical reviews, see CEci & BRuc-, supra note 11, at 47-61; StephenJ.
Ced & Maggie Bruck, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Rrew and Synthesis,
113 PS YCHOL BuL. 403 (1993) [hereinafter Ceci & Bruck, Historical Retiew]; Gail S. Good-
man, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspedive, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 9 (1984).
15 The first scientific study appeared in laurice H. Small, The Suggestibility of Children,
4 PEDAcoicAL SFmumAv 176 (1896). Small asked school-aged children to raise their hand
when they could smell the fragrance emitted from a bottle of clear liquid he uncorked in
the front of the room. In actuality, the bottle contained water, yet many children claimed
to smell its fragrance. Id. at 178. Furthermore, Small found that many of the children
were influenced by their classmates' responses. Id. at 178, 180.
16 See AuED Bmnur, Lk SuGcsnaILrrA (1900). Binet developed the Stanford.Binet
test, still one of the most widely used intelligence tests for school-aged children.
17 Bn&Tr, supra note 16, at 2.
18 Id. at 390. See HAROLD Em'msr BuRTr, APPLIjE PsmCHOLOGy 252-54 (2d ed. 1957)
(asserting that "children are more suggestible than adults"); Irene Case Sherman, The Sug-
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the operation of two different factors, one cognitive and the other
social.' 9 The first factor, which he called "auto-suggestion," develops
as a response to a child's expectation of what is supposed to happen.20
In contrast, the social factor is a desire to conform to the expectations
or pressures of an interviewer, and thus reflects a form of mental obe-
dience to another.2'
Second, Binet reported that the examiner's language and
method of questioning are among the external forces that can affect
children's responses.2 2 When children were asked for free recall-to
gestibility of Normal and Mentally Defective Children, Comp. PsYcHoL. MoNoOIM'i-s, Aug. 1924,
ser. 9, at 1, 12 ("Previous experiments have indicated that suggestibility tends to decrease
with age in normal children."); Ramona Messerschmidt, The Suggestibility of Boys and Girls
Between the Ages of Six and Sixteen Years, 43J. OF GENETIC PSYCHOL. 422-23 (1933) (summariz-
ing Binet's conclusions); Margaret Otis, A Study of Suggestibility of Children, 11 ARcivm
PSYCHOL, 5, 94-99 (1924) (concluding that resistance to suggestibility increases with mental
age).
19 See Ceci & Bruck, Historical Review, supra note 14, at 406 (identifying two aspects of
memory-recall and suggestibility); Philip S. Dale et al., The Influence of the Forn of the Ques-
tion on Eyewitness Testimony of Preschool Children, 7J. PsYcHouNoUxsac REs. 269 (1978) (ana-
lyzing children's memory); Otto Lipmann, Pedagogical Psychology of Report, 2 J. EntIG.
PSYCHOL. 253 (1911) (same). In the early years of the century, some researchers suggested
that very young children often have difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality, SeeJ Ea
PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD 202 (C. K Ogden ed., Marjorie Warden
trans., 1959) (1928).
20 BIr, supra note 16, at 86. In one of Binet's experiments, the children were
presented with five lines of increasing length, followed by a series of "target" lines that were
of the same length as the longest line of the series. Researchers then asked the children to
draw each line as accurately as possible. The children tended to be influenced by the
expectation of ever-increasing lines; that is, their reproductions of the target line were
systematically too long because they expected that it would be longer than the line that
had preceded it. Binet questioned the children after the study to determine why they had
drawn the target lines so long and discovered that many were aware that the lines they had
drawn were incorrect. In fact, they were able to redraw the lines more accurately on de-
mand. Binet argued that this experiment demonstrated the children's ability to escape the
influence of auto-suggestion. See id. at 110-60.
21 See id. at 209. For example, Binet explained that after being led to expect certain
events, some children sometimes asserted that they had witnessed those events whether or
not the events actually occurred. See id. at 241-43.
Other researchers also emphasize the significance of questioning by influential adults.
According to the German psychologist William Stem, children view suggestive questions by
influential adults as imperatives. William Stem, Abstracts of Lectures on the Psychology of Testi-
mony and on the Study of Individuality, 21 Am.J. PSYCHOL. 270 (1910). The Belgian psycholo-
gistJ. Varendonck conducted notable experiments in preparation for his testimony in a
murder case in which child witnesses had been subjected to repeat, suggestive questioning.
J. Varendonck, Les Tbmoignages d'Enfants dans un Procds Retentissant [Child Witnesses in a Fa-
mous Trial], 11 ARcHuVEs DE PSYCnOLocIE 129 (1911). In one study, seven-year-old children
were asked about the color of a teacher's beard. Id. at 138. Sixteen of eighteen children
provided a response even though the teacher in question did not have a beard. Id. In
another study, a teacher from an adjoining classroom came into Varendonck's classroom
and without removing his hat talked in an agitated fashion for approximately five minutes.
Id. at 141. After this teacher had left the classroom, the children were asked in which hand
the teacher had held his hat. Id. Only three of the twenty-seven students claimed that the
hat was not in his hand. Id.
22 BINET, supra note 16, at 245-49.
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write down everything they observed, without being aided by specific
questions-they tended to provide little information, but the informa-
tion they did provide was highly accurate.23 Children responding to
questions that focused their attention on a particular detail were
somewhat less accurate than those giving free recall, but significantly
more accurate than those asked either leading questions that sug-
gested an inaccurate answer or questions that were misleading in that
they assumed false information.2 4 Modem commentators generally
agree that there is a strong relationship between the nature of ques-
tioning and the accuracy of the response;2 moreover, the arguments
of Myers and Lyon depend quite heavily on the proposition that lead-
ing questions elicit more information.26
Third, Binet reported that children's answers to repeat questions
are often characterized by exactness and confidence, regardless of
their accuracy level.2 7 Once a child gives an erroneous response,
Binet surmised, it becomes incorporated into her memory.28
Fourth, Binet concluded that children are more suggestible in
groups than when alone.2
23 See Bn, r, supra note 16, at 255-56.
24 Bnqrr, supra note 16, at 294.
25 See, eg., Ceci & Bruck, Historiwo l-view, supra note 14, at 406 (noting Binet's find-
ing that free recall questions produce the most accurate answers);Jacqueline L Cunning-
ham, Contribution to the Histoy of Ps'dwiog,: XLVI. ThePionacr-Worl ofAlfrcdBinel on Children
as Eyewitnesses, 62 PSYCHOL REP. 271, 273 (1988) (noting that "[r]esuhs showed the nov.
familiar phenomenon that fewer but more accurate details are recalled by subjects who
report information spontaneously in comparison wvith those who respond to specific
questioning").
26 See, e.g., Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1046; Myers, Pochological Remarch, supra
note 2, at 11-26.
27 Bu-rr, supra note 16, at 324-25. Even among adults, there is often a low correlation
betveen an eyewitness's confidence and accuracy. &e Robert K Bothwell et al., Correlation
of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimali y Hpotliesis Retisited, 72 J. Amat n PbyCHiOL.
691, 694 (1987).
28 SeeBma-r, supra note 16, at 325. Binet based this belief on the fact that, in contrast
to the auto-suggestion study in which children could later redraw the line correctly, chil-
dren in the study testing the effect of the examiner's language were unable to correct their
wrong answers later. Id. at 324.
29 Id. at 359. When researchers asked a group of three children a series of misleading
questions and told them to call out the answer to each question as quickly as possible, the
children who responded second and third were most likely to give the same anmer as the
first respondent-even if that answer was inaccurate. Id. at 351-56.
The late-17th-century Swedish witch trials present an interesting analog to Binet's
findings. Sjtberg analyzed statements made by 805 children to parish priests or a "Ro)al
Commission of inquiry" and reported that the children were more likely to claim they had
witnessed extraordinary events if they gave their testimony to the parish priest after waiting
in line with other witnesses to attend prayer meetings. Sjtberg, supra note 12, at 1042-43.
Sj6berg concluded that these children were influenced by the other itnesses waiting in
line. I. He wrote that "only 59% of the children testif)ing at other places than prayer
meetings were sure about the real life quality of their experiences of the witches' sabbath
whereas as many as 91% were sure about it after standing in line at prayer meetings." Id.
In addition, Sjtberg reported that the youngest witnesses in the Swedish w-.itch trials, who
42 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:33
Early in the century, other researchers reached results consonant
with Binet's and drew conclusions that continue to find support to-
day-most notably, they concluded that repeat questioning can have a
particularly powerful effect. For example, the German psychologist
William Stern concluded that a child is more likely to remember her
answers to earlier questions than the underlying events themselves5 0
This early research is of limited usefulness in analyzing issues of
forensic significance. First, although some of the early researchers
had forensic uses in mind, the subject matter of the questions they
posed bore little resemblance to the subject matter of statements that
children give in actual cases. In the early experiments, researchers
often asked children leading questions about details that the children
likely regarded as peripheral and of little significance. For instance, a
researcher might ask questions about the color of a stranger's beard, 1
which of several lines was longer,3 2 or whether the child smelled an
odor when the questioner opened a mysterious-looking bottle con-
taining only water.35 In contrast, in actual forensic investigations-
most of which involve abuse of the child-the interviewer usually
questions the child about bodily actions that, if they occurred as al-
leged, were experienced rather than merely witnessed by the child
herself; that were central to the event in question; and that are fre-
quently associated with embarrassment, fear, and pain.34
ranged from one to six years old, were significantly more suggestible than older children.
Id.
30 See Stem, supra note 21, at 274.
31 See Varendonck, supra note 21, at 138.
32 See BIrNE, supra note 16, at 284.
33 See Small, supra note 15, at 178. Gail S. Goodman & Alison Clarke-Stewart, Suggestl-
bility in Children's Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse Investigations, in Th SumtGsrIIILrTy
OF CHIttREN's RECOL.ECrIONS 92 (John Doris ed., 1991), extends this criticism to some of
the more modem studies as well:
[M]ost research on children as eyewitnesses has relied on situations that are
very different from the personal involvement and potential trauma of sex-
ual abuse. Researchers have used brief stories, films, videotapes, or slides to
simulate a witnessed event. A few have used actual staged events, but these
events-for example... [a] man tending plants-are also qualitatively dif-
ferent from incidents of child abuse. The children are typically bystanders
to the events, there is no bodily contact between the child and adult, and it
is seldom even known whether the events hold much interest for the chil-
dren. Of even more importance. . . , the questions the children are asked
often focus on peripheral details of the incident, like what the confederate
was wearing, rather than on the main actions that occurred or, more to the
point, whether sexual acts were committed.
Id.
34 In other cases, these conditions do not necessarily hold, Thus, Varendonck
claimed that the types of questions that he used in his studies were similar to those used
with one of the child witnesses in a murder case in which he participated. Varendonck,
supra note 21, at 137-38. In a case like that one, where the child witness is not the victim of
the crime and may not even have observed it, she may have information to offer that is
important to the case even though it did not have much salience for her.
THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN
Thus, whatever the early experiments might show about the relia-
bility of children under the conditions of the experiments, they lack
external or ecological validity for the context of principal contempo-
rary significance. That is, they cannot be relied on with confidence to
show how suggestible children are in the real-world context of the
greatest interest-when a child makes an allegation about personal
abuse.
Nevertheless, this brief historical review indicates that recent re-
search on the suggestibility of children-their susceptibility to leading
questions, peer pressure, and repeated questioning, the tendency to
perceive conditions in conformity with the expectancies created by
adults, and the need to comply with adults' wishes-is not a modem
departure from earlier understandings. On the contrary, it fits
squarely within what has been the dominant view for the last century.
B. The Modem Era
1. An Overview
Research into children's suggestibility was virtually non-existent
mid-century. However, the late 1970s witnessed a resurgence of inter-
est in this area, and this interest has continued. This virtual explosion
of research was fueled by various factors, most significantly a dramatic
increase of reports of child abuse and growing recognition of the
commonness of abuse.3 5 Thus, researchers began to focus on the rea-
sons so many children failed to report abuse and on the fact that
when children did allege abuse their reports were often met with
skepticism.
As discussed below in Part I.B.2, researchers have responded to
increased abuse by emphasizing the potential value of suggestive or
other directed questioning in securing disclosure of abuse.3G Of
course, directed questioning also raises the problem of false posi-
tives. 37 Some researchers, notably Gail Goodman, have contended
that in settings of particular importance-when the questioning con-
cems a matter involving events in which the child was a participant or
a victim, rather than a mere bystander, and the questioning addresses
central aspects rather than peripheral details of the event-children
35 See Ceci & Bruck, Hiskrica! Review, supra note 14, at 408. Ceci and Bruck note that
other factors included greater receptivity by courts to expert psychological testimony, the
increased focus of social scientists on socially relevant issues (including children's rights
and protection of minors), and increased interest in the study of eyeitness testimony of
adults. See iU.
36 See, eg., Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 33, at 103; Lyon, New Mre, supra
note 2, at 1046-49; Myers, Psgrhwlogical Researd, supra note 2, at 9.
37 See ag., CEcI & BRUCK, supra note 11, at 18.
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are much less suggestible than the early experiments show.38 Part
I.B.3 discusses Professor Goodman's research and demonstrates that,
notwithstanding the optimistic interpretation scholars have sometimes
superimposed on it, the data actually indicate that even in such cir-
cumstances young children can be substantially suggestible.
Part I.B.4 illustrates that suggestibility is an even greater prob-
lem-even in matters involving intimate contact between an adult and
a child-when interviewers use more strongly suggestive procedures.
Whether a child has been subjected to such strong suggestion is a mat-
ter for the judicial system to determine on the facts of the particular
case; those facts, rather than general practice, must control the re-
sponse of the system. In Part I.B.5, however, we demonstrate that the
use of suggestive questioning has been a pervasive problem, not
merely an occasional one.
In considering the modem research, we think it is a mistake to
frame the debate as a conflict between two irreconcilable groups of
scientists. Scholars working in this area are far more interactive39 and
closer in agreement with one another than a reader might infer from
portions of Lyon's article. As Lyon recognizes, scholarship by Ceci
and Bruck has received broad professional and academic endorse-
ment.40 Furthermore, the amicus brief on suggestibility written by the
Committee of Concerned Social Scientists and submitted in support
of the defense in the famous case of Kelly Michaels41 was signed by
forty-three of the forty-six memory researchers who were asked to do
So.4 2 Goodman was one of the three who declined to sign the brief,
but Lyon recognizes that "several of the nation's most well-respected
38 See Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 33, at 95, 103; Goodman et al., Children's
Concerns and Memory: Issues of Ecological Validity in the Study of Children's Eyewitness Testimony,
in KNOWING AND REMEMBERING IN YOUNG CHILDREN, 249, 256 (Robyn Fivush & Judith A.
Hudson eds., 1990).
39 For example, Goodman has published some of her work in Ceci's volumes and has
participated in several symposia he has organized. The same is true in reverse: CecIl has
appeared in symposia organized by Goodman, and Poole, Bruck, and others, either to
collaborate on writing projects with Goodman or to write chapters for volumes she edits,
40 See Lyon, New Wav4 supra note 2, at 1010 (citing Ceci and Bruck's Historical Revitew,
supra note 14, which was named the best article of the year on child abuse by the Society
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues of the American Psychological Association
(APA)). In addition, Ceci and Bruck'sJeopardy in the Courtroom won the APA's annual Wit-
liam James Book Award for 2000 for the book that best integrates research across diverse
areas of psychology. CECt & BRUCK, supra note 11.
41 State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (NJ. 1994).
42 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Developmental, Social, and Psychological Research-
ers, Social Scientists and Scholars, State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (NJ. 1994), reprinted in
Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, Amicus Brieffor the Case of State of NewJersey v. Michaels
Presented by Committee of Concerned Social Scientists, 1 PSvCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 272, 312-14
(1995) (listing the signatories).
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researchers in psychology" were among the forty-three signers.43
Goodman's works, as we will show, present evidence that strongly sup-
ports Ceci and Bruck's arguments. The reverse is also true; Ceci and
Bruck's writings are also replete with provisos about children's
strengths as witnesses. Virtually all research in the scientific main-
stream, including that of Goodman, pays at least some attention to the
dangers of both false positives and of false negatives.44 Most scholars
in the field produce work that is helpful in some contexts to the de-
fendant and in some contexts to the prosecution or plaintiff, indeed,
several of the scholars who are part of what Lyon calls the "new wave"
have consulted for both sides in litigation.45 As one would expect, the
diverse scholars in this field vigorously disagree about some matters of
interpretation. These disagreements are not merely between one
group and another-assuming the groups can be well defined-but
are within the groups as well.
2. The Benefits of Directed Questioning
Since the time of Binet, psychologists have understood that a
child's free recall tends to be more accurate than her responses to
suggestive questioning.46 However, free recall also tends to be ex-
tremely sparse. When asked for free recall, children usually give cor-
rect but very brief answers, and they often omit important details. 47
This is especially true for very young children, particularly in the
abuse context; as Lyon emphasizes, fear, embarrassment or loyalty
may inhibit a child from disclosing abuse.48
43 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1012 n.39. One of the signatories was Alison
Clarke-Stewart, who coauthored one of the papers on which Lyon relies. See id. (citing
Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 33).
44 There is also no stylistic divide between groups. Lyon asserts that "[t]he new-wave
researchers are not only scientists, but also storytellers who disseminate their most impres-
sive subjects as aggressively as their cumulative data." Lyon, New ave, supra note 2, at 1084
(footnote omitted). Attendance at international conferences during the past decade, how.-
ever, would suffice to convince any observer that the use of vivid horror stories is not the
exclusive province of one type of researcher.
45 This list includes Ceci, Poole, Lamb, Warren, and Bruck. Some, like Ceci, have not
accepted remuneration for consulting on child sexual abuse cases.
46 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
47 See Btwr, supra note 16, at 255-56, 294.
48 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1048. According to Lyon, Ceci and Bruck argue
that "threats do not suppress disclosure." Id. at 1060. Though Ceci and Bruck do make
statements to that effect, they present mixed results from several studies of different types.
See Cxci & BRucKF, supra note 11, at 35, 141 n.1, 263-65, 301. We concede Lyon's point that
studies of disclosure that examine only those children who eventually are identified as
having been abused are imperfect indices of the efficacy of threats, because they may miss
many children who were threatened into never disclosing. However, in addition to the
real-world studies, laboratory studies by Peters and others seem to indicate that threats,
fears, and other forces often do not affect ultimate disclosure after some passage of time
and when the child feels safe. See id. In laboratory studies, we know vuith certainty which
children were threatened.
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Abuse investigators therefore often use more directed and fo-
cused approaches, such as leading and repeated questions, thereby
attempting to secure useful information from the child. Some mod-
em research highlights the potential value of these techniques. For
example, Karen Saywitz and Gail Goodman conducted a study dis-
cussed approvingly by Myers and Lyon.49 The study showed that when
girls whose pediatric examinations had included an exterior vaginal
and anal examination were asked for their free recall, only eight of
thirty-six (22%) correctly mentioned the vaginal touch, and only four
of thirty-six (11%) mentioned the anal touch.50 Directed questioning
with the aid of anatomically correct dolls raised the numbers to thirty-
one (86%) and twenty-five (69%), respectively.5 1 There is no serious
doubt that directed questioning will often be far more effective than
requests for free recall in securing disclosure of abuse.5 2
This is one side of the coin. The risk of the false positives poten-
tially created by suggestive questioning is the other.
3. Studies of Suggestibility by Goodman and Her Colleagues
The modem research on suggestibility is profuse and varied.
Rather than attempt a full summary, we discuss four studies con-
ducted by Gail Goodman and her colleagues. We have chosen Good-
man because she is the scholar most favored by child advocates. Ceci
and Bruck have written that "[p] erhaps no researcher has done more
We are unclear what Lyon means when he writes that "Ceci and Bruck omit the discus-
sion of Peters's work as documenting a reluctance to disclose transgressions from their
1995 book," Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1050. In fact, Ceci and Bruck write:
[P]erpetrators may use threats... to silence their victims. There have been
a few studies that have examined the effectiveness of such threats in a labo-
ratory setting. Peters (1990) staged an event in which children between 5
and 9 years of age saw a "thief" come into the testing room and steal a book.
The "thief" told the child not to tell. When later questioned about the event
by a parent, only 5% of the children disclosed the theft if the thief was also
present. If the thief left the room, however, 67% of the children told about
the theft.
See CEci & BRucx, supra note 11, at 145 n.1 (citation omitted); see also Lurc' S. McGot,
CHILD WrrNsss: FRAGILE VoicEs IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SyS-EM (1994) (reviewing other
studies concerning threats).
49 SeeKarenJ. Saywitz et al., Children's Memories of a Physical Examination Involving Geni-
tal Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. CONSULTING & CUINICAL Ps'cI ioL.
682 (1991) (cited in Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1017-18 & n.59, and in 1 JOHN E.B.
MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr QAsEs § 1.27, at 65 (3d ed. 1997)).
50 Saywitz et al., supra note 49, at 686-87.
51 Id. Against such results must be placed studies indicating that children tend to
respond more informatively to open-ended invitations when they have been conditioned to
answer such questions, rather than more focused questions, in the early part of the inter-
view. Kathleen J. Sternberg et al., Effects of Introductoiy Style on Children's Abilities to Desribe
Experiences of Sexual Abuse 21 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLEcr 1133 (1997).
52 See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1064; cf. id. at 1067 (interpreting one study as
providing "a compelling anecdote that children may be reluctant to affirm events that they
believe are naughty").
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to redress the historical imbalance in favor of child witnesses than Gail
Goodman."53 Lyon, who relies heavily on Goodman's work, suggests
that she "became the researcher-heroine of the child protection
movement in the 1980s because her research supported claims that
false allegations of abuse rarely, if ever, occur."54 And yet her studies
provide strong evidence that children, especially young children, are
suggestible to a significant degree-even on abuse-related questions.S7
a. The Pediatric Exam Study
We have already described one part of a study by Saywitz and
Goodman, in which girls whose genitalia and anus were touched dur-
ing a pediatric examination were much more likely to report that
touching occurred in response to doll-aided directed questioning
than in response to open-ended questions. 56 The other part of the
study posed the same questions to girls whose genitalia had not been
touched during the exam.57 The vast majority of these girls correctly
denied a genital touch.58 But one out of thirty-five (2.86%) did an-
swer affirmatively when asked about a genital touch, and two out of
thirty-six girls (5.56%) answered affirmatively when asked about an
anal touch.59 Saywitz and her colleagues concluded that "although
there is a risk of increased error with doll-aided direct questions, there
is an even greater risk that not asking about vaginal and anal touch
leaves the majority of such touch unreported."60
b. The Delayed Inquiry Study
In another study, Goodman and her colleagues asked three- to
six-year-olds to play a game with a strange man for approximately five
53 Ced & Bruck, Historial Review, supra note 14, at 410.
54 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1015 (footnote omitted).
55 As Lyon points out, Goodman was one of only three researchers, out of forty-six
asked to cosign the amicus brief on suggestibility in support of the defense in the famous
Kelly Michaels case, who declined to do so. Id. at 1011-12.
56 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. In this study, the mean rates of cor-
rect answers in response to misleading abuse questions ranged from 96% to 99%. Sie
Saywitz et al., supra note 49, at 688. But when the children wvere asked direct, non-mislead-
ing questions about potentially abusive events (for example, "Did the man kiss you?"), their
accuracy rates were not as high, ranging from 77% to 87% accuracy. Id. The basis for this
perplexing finding is unclear. Ceci and Bruck have suggested that perhaps the reason is
that the misleading questions were so unusual and "unmotivated" (in other words, the
studies did not give the children any reason to assent to misleading questions by the use of
threats, bribes, peer pressure, or cajoling) that the children perceived them as ridiculous
or silly, and easily rejected them. Ced & Bruck, supra note 14, at 426. In contrast, the
nonmisleading questions were at least plausible to the children. S&e id.
57 Saywitz et aL, supra note 49, at 684.
58 See id. at 687.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
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minutes. 61 During this time, the man did not engage in any sexually
provocative behaviors. 62  Four years later, the researchers
reinterviewed fifteen of these same children, now between seven and
ten years old, and asked them what they could recall of their prior
experience with the strange man.63 Not surprisingly, the children
could not remember much. 64 Then, to create an "atmosphere of ac-
cusation," the interviewers asked questions such as: "Are you afraid to
tell?" and 'You'll feel better once you've told."65 Goodman wrote that
"[t]he children were more accurate on the abuse than the nonabuse
questions."66 Nevertheless, these children were quite susceptible to
abuse-related questioning. Four of the fifteen children agreed with
the interviewer's false suggestion that the stranger had kissed or
hugged them; four out of the fifteen agreed that the stranger had
taken pictures of them; and one child even agreed she had been given
a bath by the stranger. 67 Goodman and her colleagues acknowledged
that some of these errors "might well lead to suspicion [of abuse]."6s
c. The Trailer Study
Rudy and Goodman conducted a third study in which pairs of
four- and seven-year-olds, eighteen children of each age, were left in a
trailer with a strange adult.69 One child watched while the adult
played games with the other, helped her dress in a clown's costume,
lifted her onto a desk, and took two photographs of her.70 Ten to
twelve days later, Rudy and Goodman asked each child various ques-
61 Gail S. Goodman et al., Children's Testimony Nearly Four Years After an Event 5
(1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author Ceci).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 5-6.
64 Id. at 7-8.
65 Id. at 7.
66 Id. at 15.
67 1&L at 12.
68 Id. at 14.
69 Leslie Rudy & Gail S. Goodman, Effects of Participation on Children's Reports: Implica-
lionsfor Children's Testimony, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL 527, 529 (1991). In this study, as
in the Pediatric Exam study, the children's answers to misleading abuse questions were
correct more frequently than were their answers to directed but nonmisleading questions
about potentially abusive events, such as "Did the man kiss you?" See id. at 532-33 In the
Trailer Study, the means for the first type ranged from 88% to 94%, see id. at 533, and from
82% to 90% for the second type. See id. at 532. Again, the explanation may be that the
children were sufficiently confident to reject the misleading questions out of hand, In-
deed, Goodman and her colleagues, in discussing the Trailer Study, noted that the chil-
dren often giggled in response to the misleading questions or otherwise acted in a way
reflecting their perception of the question as silly. Goodman et al., supra note 38, at 266
("We also noticed that children's demeanor changed once we began to ask the abuse ques-
tions. Many showed signs of embarrassment by giggling or smiling. Others looked
surprised.").
70 Rudy & Goodman, supra note 69, at 529-30.
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tions about the incident.7 Some of the questions involved actions
that might be of special concern in child abuse investigations, such as,
"How many times did he spank you?" and "Did he put anything into
your mouth?"72 Rudy and Goodman reported that the "[s]even-year-
olds did not make a single commission error to the specific abuse
questions."73 The four-year-old participants "made very few commis-
sion errors," while the four-year-old bystanders "evidenced a slightly
higher, but still low, error rate"; these error rates were 3% and 7%,
respectively.74
d. The Mt. Sinai Study
Goodman and her colleagues also conducted an experiment in-
volving 108 children between the ages of three and fifteen who were
examined at Chicago's Mt. Sinai Hospital as part of a five-day assess-
ment of children with suspected histories of abuse.75 The sound idea
behind this experiment was that researchers could gain ecological -a-
lidity by studying children who were actually involved in abuse investi-
gations.76 On day one of their stay, the children received a medical
check-up.77 On day two, the abused children were given an
anogenital examination and swabbed for culture.78 On day five, the
children were interviewed, and the interview included misleading or
other suggestive questions.7 9
Despite fairly substantial levels of incorrect answers to misleading,
abuse-related questions by the pre-schoolers, Goodman and her col-
leagues developed an optimistic reading of the data:
[D]espite performing more poorly than their older counterparts,
the 3- to-5-year-olds still demonstrated relatively good resistance to mis-
leading information in answering the abuse-related questions.
71 Id. at 530.
72 Id at 529.
73 I& at 532.
74 Id.
75 Mitchell L Eisen et al., Mernoy and Suggestibility in Maltreated Cdildren: New Research
Relevant to EvaluatingAllegations ofAbus in TRUTH IN MNEMory 163, 175-77 (StevenJay Lynn
& Kevin M. McConkey eds., 1998). Approximately 31% of these childrcnwere classified as
having been sexually abused, 10% as physically abused, 10% as neglected, 16% as having
addicted parents, and 22% as a control group (that is, neither abused nor neglected). Id.
at 178 tbl.7.1. In preliminary anal)ses the authors found no significant differences in er-
rors among these various groups of children, so they lumped them together in reporting
their results and instead focused on age differences. Id. at 178-80.
76 The authors expressed the view that, because of various problems that they suf-
fered, this group might be more suggestible than the children typically involved in suggest-
ibility studies. See i. at 172-73. "It is also possible," they urote, "that abused children are
hypervigilant regarding abusive actions or abuse suggestions and, as a result, would be
more resistant to such questioning than nonabused children." Id. at 175.
77 Id. at 176.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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When presented with misleading questions related to abusive or in-
appropriate behavior by the doctor and/or nurse (e.g., "How many
times did the doctor kiss you?"), 3- to-5-year-olds answered 79% of
the questions without making commission errors.80
Of course, the unstated implication is that this group did make com-
mission errors in answering 21% of the misleading abuse-related ques-
tions. Moreover, the authors reported that the preschool-aged
children gave incorrect answers to 40% of all misleading, abuse-re-
lated questions.81 They also pointed out that "approximately 40% of
the errors made by 3- to 5-year-olds in response to the misleading
abuse-related questions were produced by only 6 of the 29 children in
this group."82 Thus, although the group's "proportion of commission
errors to misleading abuse-related questions was relatively low on aver-
age," some children were "more error-prone than others."83 "If such
children were interviewed in an abuse investigation," the authors ac-
knowledge, "a false accusation could potentially result."8 4 Children in
the older groups performed substantially better, but still answered a
nontrivial percentage of the misleading abuse-related questions incor-
rectly-16% for the six- to ten-year-olds, and 9% for the eleven- to
fifteen-year-olds. 85
These studies are each important for understanding children's
intellectual development and for revealing the underlying mecha-
nisms of suggestibility and memory. But any use of them for forensic
purposes must take into account six points.
First, as Lyon acknowledges, "calling nondisclosure the 'greater
risk' implicitly assumes that both kinds of risk are weighed equally."86
That is a dubious assumption. Consider two polar cases. If false dis-
closures could be disproved without cost, then, for reasons we discuss
in Part II, our system might tolerate a large number of them to gener-
ate some true disclosures; the initial disclosure would thus be treated
as a screening device. If, at the other extreme, it is certain that a po-
tential defendant would be convicted given a disclosure (whether true
or not) and acquitted without a disclosure, then, for reasons we also
discuss in Part H, our system treats the cost of a false disclosure as far
greater than the cost of failure to make an accurate disclosure. Thus,
80 Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 179 tbl.7.2. We are unsure of the basis for the difference between this 40%
value and the 21% implied by the quote above. Perhaps the basis is the distinction be-
tween abuse-related questions that concerned the doctor or nurse, versus abuse-related
questions concerning others.
82 Id. at 179.
83 Id. at 180.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 179.
86 Lyon, New Wav4 supra note 2, at 1019 n.74.
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it is far from clear that nondisclosure is the greater risk simply because
it is numerically more prevalent.
Second, the probability that a child would answer any given ques-
tion falsely should not be confused with the probability that a child
would answer some questions falsely. For example, in the Trailer
Study, the 3% and 7% error rates for four-year-old participants and
bystanders in response to misleading abuse questions must be under-
stood in conjunction with the fact that there were only nine children
in each group; this means that at least one of the nine children gave at
least one false, affirmative answer to an abuse-related question.
Third, in the above studies, the children responded less accu-
rately to the so-called "direct" questions concerning abuse than to af-
firmatively misleading questions. It may be that the content of the
misleading questions made them more difficult to accept, or that
some subtle verbal or nonverbal cues in the phrasing of these ques-
tions alerted children to the fact that they were in fact misleading.87
Whatever the explanation, the most important measure of children's
vulnerability to suggestion is their reliability in response to the type of
question most likely to lead them into misstatement.
Fourth, one must avoid the temptation, into which several schol-
ars have fallen, to draw the following type of non sequitur
The children in the studies by Goodman and associates were gener-
ally accurate in reporting specific and personal things that had hap-
pened to them. If these results can be generalized to investigations of
abuse, they suggest that normal children are unlikely to make up
details of sexual acts when nothing abusive happened.88
The argument is illogical. In determining the probability of a false
positive, the premise is that "nothing abusive happened"; if abuse did
occur, then there cannot be a false positive. Thus, it seems mistaken
in this context to speak of abuse-related questions as being central or
salient to an event-by hypothesis there was no such event. We would
expect older children and adults to be better equipped to reject false
suggestions about events that would be perceived as salient and central
had they happened, because these older individuals would recognize
that had such events occurred they would likely have left vivid memory
traces. This is called an "intuitive theory of memory," meaning that
adults try to determine whether a recollection is real (that is, due to
actual experience) or fictitious (for example, due to suggestion, fan-
tasy, or imagination) by asking themselves whether it is likely that they
87 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
88 John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Chldd Witnesses? A Step in the WrongDiretion, 46
BAYLOR L REV. 873, 922 n.232 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Goodman & Clarke-
Stewart, supra note 33, at 102-03).
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could have had such a salient experience and forgotten it.8 9 Younger
children are much less likely to have this capacity to interrogate the
workings of their own memory.90
Fifth, even if we were to assume that the probability is only 3%
that a child would make a statement wrongfully alleging abuse, this
does not mean that, if a child does make a statement alleging abuse,
the probability is Only 3% that abuse did not occur. Equating these
two probabilities-the probability of the event given the hypothesis
and the probability of the hypothesis given the event-is a common
error, often referred to as "transposing the conditional" or, in some
settings, as the "prosecutor's fallacy."9' If, apart from the child's state-
ment, the probability is very low that the child was abused, then even a
3% probability that a child who was not abused would say she was
could result in a very high probability that the child was not abused.
Suppose that a random sample of the child population, only 2% of
whom have been abused, is questioned in such a way that 90% of
those who have been abused but only 3% of those who have not been
abused will confirm that they have been abused. Then more than
60% of those who answer that they have been abused will be speaking
falsely.9 2 We return to this problem, which Lyon recognizes, in Part
II.
Finally, although the four studies we have discussed used sugges-
tive questions-"Did the doctor touch you there?"; "How many times
did he spank you?"; "Did he put anything into your mouth?"; "How
many times did the doctor kiss you?"-they did not use highly sugges-
tive techniques such as repeated questioning over time,9 3 coercion, or
89 See generally Michael Ross, Relation of Implicit Theories to the Construction of Personal
Histories, 96 PSYCHOL. REv. 341, 341-42 (1989) (analyzing the process of personal recall).
90 SeeJohn H. Flavell, The Development of Children's Knowledge About the lind: From Cog.
nitive Connections to Mental Representations, in DEVELOPING THEORIES OF MIND 244, 246-17
(Janet W. Astington et al. eds., 1988).
91 See, e.g., BEmARD ROBERTSON & GA. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING
FOa EsIc SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 19-20, 91-93 (1995) (defining the concept of trans-
posing the conditional and the prosecutor's fallacy); David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly,
The Prosecutor's Fallacy and DNA Evidence 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 711, 716-17.
92 Suppose there are 10,000 children, 2% of whom (200) were abused, and 90% of
those (180) confirm that they have been abused. There are 9,800 nonabused children,
and if only 3% of them say they have been abused, that yields 294 false positives. Thus, of
the 10,000 children, 474 say they were abused-but this is false in 294 cases, or about 62%
of the time.
93 See generally Debra Ann Poole & Lawrence T. White, Tell Me Again and Again: Stabil-
ity and Change in the Repeated Testimonies of Children and Adults, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN
THE CHILD WrrNss 24 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Poole & White,
Tell Me Again and Again] (reporting on the effects of question repetition in test subjects);
Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Two Years Later: Effects of Question Repetition and Reten.
tion Interval on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCI-lOL.
844 (1993) [hereinafter Poole & White, Two Years Later] (same).
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peer pressure.94 Moreover, in three of the four studies, the suggestive
questions were embedded in neutral or supportive interviews. These
studies therefore pose weak tests of young children's vulnerability to
suggestion. They do not indicate the limits on how a combination of
motives, strong suggestions, threats, and inducements might lead a
child to make an inaccurate report. As we now show, these highly
suggestive techniques can produce much higher error rates.
To recap, even if one looks no further than the body of research
favored by child advocates, that of Gail Goodman and her associates,
the proportion of false claims-that is, the proportion of children
who were not exposed to a given type of behavior who nevertheless
asserted that they were-ranged between 3 and 40%. Even the lowest
end of this range can lead to unacceptably high decision-making er-
rors in some circumstances, as we demonstrate with the aid of
probability theory in Part II. But, as we have already suggested, this
research does not indicate the rate of false claims that occur when the
child is subjected to stronger forms of suggestion. We now develop
this latter point.
4. The Impact of Highly Suggestive Techniques
As we have indicated, the studies described above may underesti-
mate the susceptibility of young children to stronger suggestions. To
test this hypothesis, researchers have conducted a number of studies
incorporating stronger forms of suggestion-techniques that have
been used by investigators in some well-publicized child abuse cases.9 3
Among these stronger forms of suggestion that researchers have
shown to lead to false assertions are the following: repetition of ques-
tions within the same interview,96 stereotype inducement,97 guided
94 This is a point that the authors recognized. SeSa)witz et al., supra note 49, at 690-
91. It wvas principally this factor that led Maggie Bruck, in an unfortunate choice ofwords
(for which Lyon calls her to task) in giving testimony, to refer to Sapitz's study as "mean-
ingless." See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1018, 1020.
95 See CECa & BRucK, supra note 11, at 9-18.
96 See Poole & White, Tell Me Again and Again, supra note 93, at 36; Poole & White,
Two Years Later, supra note 93, at 851.
97 See Michelle D. Leichtman & StephenJ. Ceci, The Efferts of Stnmypres and Sugvstions
on Preschoolers' Reports, 31 DvELopim..NTAL PsicnoL 568, 572 (1995). Stereotype induce-
ment is the creation of false expectations that lead subsequently to false reports consistent
with those expectations.
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imagery,98 peer pressure, and selective reinforcement. 99 As we
demonstrate below, numerous studies show that when children are
exposed to these forms of suggestion the error rates can be very high,
sometimes exceeding 50%. Moreover, this phenomenon holds true
even when the questions concern events that supposedly affect the
child herself, as opposed to events to which she was a mere bystander,
even when the questions are central, rather than peripheral, to the
alleged event, and even when the questions concern abuse-related
matters. As we did with respect to the research favored by child advo-
cates, we will discuss here only a small selection of the relevant studies.
Sena Garven and her colleagues used strong suggestions-such as
reinforcing answers that were consistent with interviewers' hunches
and invoking pressure to conform-based on the use of those same
tactics in the McMartin daycare sexual abuse case. 100 Garven and her
colleagues found a 58% false claim rate as to various behaviors in
which an adult had supposedly engaged, versus only a 17% error rate
when weaker suggestions were used.10' In a follow-up publication,
these researchers found between 35 and 52% false claims, including
statements that the adult had tickled the child's tummy or had kissed
the child on the nose, in response to strong suggestions, versus 13 to
15% when strong suggestions were not used. 0 2 Other researchers
98 Ceci and Bruck describe a forensic example of guided imagery in which a therapist
engaged the child-client in fantasy play about being trapped in a crash with the defendant.
CECI & BRUcK, supra note 11, at 214-15. A research example is an experiment in which the
researcher encourages a child to imagine an event that allegedly transpired (for example,
getting her hand caught in a mousetrap and having to go to the hospital to get the hand
released) by providing perceptual cues, such as what the child was wearing when she sup.
posedly by went to the hospital or how her finger was bandaged. StephenJ. Ceci et al., 7he
Possible Role of Source Misattributions in the Creation ofFalse Beliefs Among Preschoolers, 42 IN, rr'tJ,
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 304, 306-07 (1994).
99 Sena Garven et al., More than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 356 (1998). Selective reinforcement
refers to interviewer conduct giving more positive signals to statements by the child consis-
tent with the interviewer's hypothesis than to statements inconsistent with that hypothesis,
100 Id. at 348-50.
101 Id. at 354.
102 Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement on Children's
Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38 (2000). The following exchange,
which occurred in the interviewers' study, is an example of a combination of conformity
pressure with positive reinforcement:
I: The other kids say that Paco took them to a farm. Did Paco take you to a
farm?
C: Yes.
I: Great. You're doing excellent now.
Id. at 41. The specific false claims that various children in this study made concerning
Paco Perez's conduct, in addition to those mentioned in the text, were that Paco Perez (a)
tore a book, (b) stole a pen from the teacher's desk, (c) broke a toy, (d) told the child a
secret, (e) threw a crayon at a child who was talking, (f) said a bad word, (g) took the child
on a helicopter ride, (h) took the child to a farm, and (i) took the child on a horse ride.
Id. at 41-43.
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who have used these stronger suggestive techniques also have re-
ported high error rates for children's claims that a strange man
"put[ I something yucky into their mouths" during a visit to a science
exhibit, 03 took off their clothes and kissed them,10 4 or touched them
inappropriately' 0 5
Studies focusing on repeated questions include a study by Bruck
and her colleagues in which three-year-olds were repeatedly asked
strongly suggestive questions about a doctor touching their anogenital
regions, such as, "Show me on the doll how Dr. F. touched your geni-
tals."106 Among girls whom the doctor did not touch, fully 50% falsely
claimed the doctor had inserted objects into their anogenital cavi-
ties.'0 7 After a third exposure in a period of a week to an anatomically
correct doll, one three-year-old child reported that her pediatrician
had strangled her with a rope, inserted a stick into her vagina, and
hammered an earscope into her anus.108
Similarly, Steward and Steward and their associates interviewed
children aged three to six four times after a pediatric clinic visit. 0 9
With each interview these researchers conducted, children's false re-
ports of anal touching increased; by the final interview, which took
place six months after the initial visit, more than one-third of the chil-
dren in this study falsely reported anal touching." 0
Poole & White interviewed some four-, six-, and eight-year-olds,
and adults immediately after a staged encounter with a man, and
again one week later."' They interviewed another group of subjects
only once, after a delay of one week." 2 Some of the repeated ques-
103 Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, InterviewingPreschooles Efferts of Nonsuggestke
Techniques, Parental Coaching, and Leading Questions on Reports of Nonexperenced Eents 60J.
ExaPERmEhLw. CHILD PSYCHo- 129, 143 (1995).
104 See StephenJ. Lepore & Barbara Sesco, Distorting Children's Reports and Intepretations
of Events Through Suggestion, 79 J. APPLIED Psc-oi- 108, 112 (1994).
105 SeeJane Mary Raws, How Question Form and Body-parts Diagrams Can Affect the Content
of Young Children's Disclosures (paper presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute,
Recollections of Trauma: Scientific Research and Clinical Practice, 1996), summarized in
E-mail from Winston Wealleans to StephenJ. Ceci (Apr. 11, 1996, 20:55:41) (on file ith
author Ced).
106 Maggie Bruck et aL, Anatomically DetailedDollsDo Not Fadlitate Preschoolers'Reports of
a Pediatric Examination Involving Genital Touching, 1 J. Ex-,mF'r, U. PSvCmoL: AprLIED 95,
100 (1995).
107 1d. at 102. Among boys, the error rates were lower, in the neighborhood of 207.
Id. This differential is explained by the fact that the girl doll had one more aperture than
the boy doll, giving the girls additional opportunity for insertion of props or fingers. Id.
108 Id. at 106.
109 See largaret Steward et al., Interviewing Young Children About Body Touching and Han-
dling; in 61 MONOGRAPHS OF THE Socrr FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DaE.oP,%iFsr v (45 Ser.
248) (1996).
110 See id. at 116 tbl.31, 123-24.
111 Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Effcts of Question Repetition on the Eyewitness
Testimony of Children and Adults 27 DEvELoPMErNTAL PSYCHOL 975, 976-77 (1991).
112 Id. at 977.
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dons were open-ended, such as "What did [the man] look like?",
whereas others were closed or yes-or-no, such as "Did the man hurt
Melanie?" 11 3 Poole and White reported that the "repeat-interview"
four-year-olds were significantly more likely than the "single-delayed"
ones to give a false affirmative answer to the question, "Did the man
hurt Melanie?"; the repetition of the open-ended questions, in con-
trast, did not result in more errors. 114 But there was no difference
between the two groups with respect to the question, "Did the man
ask nicely for the pen?" 115
Finally, in a study by Rawls, thirty five-year-olds and seven four-
year-olds participated in a series of benign play events with a male
adult.116 Over the course of four interviews, the children were asked
both open-ended questions, such as, "Where were you with X?" and
"What sort of things did you do with him?", and closed questions, such
as, "Do you know why he touched that part of your body?" 17 Rawls
reported that nearly a quarter of her sample falsely claimed the man
inappropriately touched them, with three of the children (10%)
falsely reporting genital touching, two (7%) falsely reporting anal
touching, and two additional children reporting mutual adult-child
touching (for example, claiming the adult pretended to rub cream
into their bodies). 118 And, finally, in the so-called "Monkey Thief'
Study, which Lyon discusses, 1 9 Bruck and Ceci found that over half of
the youngest children made false claims of witnessing theft of food in
their daycare facility after exposure to repeated suggestions and
pressures. 120
These studies and others like them indicate quite clearly that if
children, especially very young children, are subjected to highly sug-
gestive questioning techniques, their rates of false claims, even on
113 Id.
114 1&. at 978-81.
115 Id. at 981. Regardless of the subjects' age and gender, those in the repeat condi-
tion reported that the man hurt Melanie (60%) much more frequently than those in the
single interview condition (33%). Id.
116 Rawls, supra note 105.
117 Id.
118 According to Rawls, "[R]eports of mutual undressing without touching were also
common, although this often reflected a confusion between dress-up items and ordinary
clothes." Id.
119 See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1024-26.
120 SeeBruck et al., Children's Reports of Pleasant and Unpleasant Even4 in REcottErioNs
OF TRAuMA 199, 203, 205 fig.1, 211 (J. Don Read & D. Stephen Lindsay eds., 1997). For
additional examples of false claims-involving bodily touching or witnessing a bicycle
theft-see, for example, William S. Cassel & David F. Bjorklund, Deveopmental Patterns of
Eyewitness Memory and Suggestibility: An Ecologically Based Short-Term Longitudinal Study, 19
LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 507, 522-23 (1995) (bicycle theft experiment); Peter A. Ornstein et al,
The Influence of Prior Knowledge on Children's Memoty for Salient Medical Experiences, in MmoRMO
FOR EVERYDAY ANm EMOrIONAL EVENTS 83, 88-90 (Nancy L. Stein et al. eds., 1997) (doctor
experiment).
[Vol. 86:3
THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN
abuse-related questions, may be very high-far higher than reported
in studies not using such highly suggestive techniques. Of course
these studies have limited utility for forensic purposes unless children
are in fact exposed to these techniques in the real world of abuse in-
vestigation. We now turn to that question.
5. Suggestiveness in the Real World
The research on the effects of suggestive questioning has real-
world applicability at least to the extent of revealing the risks of such
questioning. The research should therefore be a factor in deciding
whether, in given circumstances, suggestive questioning is appropri-
ate. But child advocates contend that research indicating the suggesti-
bility of children has little real-world applicability in judging the
credibility of children because it is predicated on a false assumption
about the nature and incidence of suggestive questioning by investiga-
tive interviewers. Thus, Lyon says that "[t]he new wave .... pre-
sent[s] a distorted picture of the suggestibility problems in the typical
case." 121 Myers similarly accuses Ceci and Bruck of implying falsely
that "the norm in child abuse investigations is to interview children
multiple times and to overuse and abuse leading questions." 1 - This
issue is the linchpin of the child advocates' argument. Indeed, Lyon is
probably accurate in saying, "[d]ifferences between the new wave and
Goodman and her colleagues may derive more from differing assump-
tions about what interviews are like than from differing beliefs about
children's vulnerability." 23
At the outset, it is important to bear in mind that, so far as any
decisions the legal system must make in a given case are concerned,
the question of suggestiveness fundamentally depends on the facts of
the particular case and not on the commonness or uncommonness of
a given style of interrogation. If a given style of questioning was used
in the particular case before the court, then research related to it
would be highly relevant-no matter how unusual that type of ques-
tioning may be. This point is a double-edged sword.
On one hand, we fully agree that studies involving a given type of
suggestion will have little or no bearing on a case in which that type of
suggestion was absent 2 4 For example, as Lyon points out, the Mon-
121 Lyon, New IVave, supra note 2, at 1013.
122 Myers, New Era, supra note 2, at 394.
123 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1027-28.
124 Cf Ced & Bruck, Historical Review, supra note 14, at 433 (listing various conditions
that affect interviewees). Ced and Bruck note:
If the child's disclosure was made in a nonthreatening, nonsuggestible at-
mosphere, if the disclosure was not made after repeated inteniems, if the
adults who had access to the child prior to his or her testimony are not
motivated to distort the child's recollections through relentless and potent
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key Thief Study involved asking children several suggestive questions
during each of several interviews, which also included peer pressure
and encouragement to visualize an incident 25 Error rates as high as
those observed in this study are unlikely in cases that contain far fewer
suggestions. Ceci and Bruck themselves have made this point
repeatedly. 126
On the other hand, if it is clear-as it has been in some notorious
cases127-that highly suggestive techniques were used in the particular
case, then research on that type of suggestibility obviously becomes a
significant matter, without regard to whether those techniques are
typical or rare.
Lyon acknowledges this latter point.128 But, he argues,
how interviewers conducted interviews is largely unknown in many,
if not most, cases. Although many jurisdictions require videotaping
or taping of investigatory interviews, most do not. Furthermore, it
would be impractical to impose a requirement that individuals re-
cord the first contact with the child giving rise to a suspicion of
abuse because such contact arises between children and parents or
teachers, rather than during a formal abuse investigation.... In
sum, to make judgments in individual cases, courts often must make
assumptions about how interviewers typically interview children. 129
suggestions and outright coaching, and if the child's original report re-
mains highly consistent over a period of time, then the young child would
be judged to be capable of providing much that is forensically relevant.
The absence of any of these conditions would not in and of itself invalidate
a child's testimony, but it ought to raise cautions in the mind of the court.
125 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1039.
126 For example, see Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Child Witnesses: Translating Re-
search into Policy, Soc. PoL'y RP., Fall 1993, at 18-19:
Measures can be taken to lessen the risk of suggestibility effects. To
date, the factors that we know most about concern the nature of the inter-
view itself-its frequency, degree of suggestiveness, and demand
characteristics.
A child's report is less likely to be distorted, for example, after one
interview than after several interviews (the term "interviews" here in-
cludes informal conversations between parents and child about the tar-
get events).
Thus, at one extreme we can have more confidence in a child's sponta-
neous statements made prior to any attempt by an adult to elicit what they
suspect may be the truth. At the other extreme, we are more likely to be
concerned when a child has made a statement after prolonged, repeated,
suggestive interviews. Unfortunately, most cases lie between these extremes
and require a case-by-case analysis.
127 See, e.g., CEci & BRUCK, supra note 11, at 9-11 (the Little Rascals Day Care Case), 11-
13 (the Kelly Michaels Case), 13-14 (the Old Cutler Presbyterian Case), 14-16 (the Country
Walk Babysitting Service Case).
128 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1026 ("Obviously, if one knows whether a particu-
lar child was interviewed with suggestive techniques, then one need not ask what most
interviews are like.").
129 Id. at 1026-27.
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Two aspects of this argument strike us as most curious. First, for
investigatory interviews, a videotaping requirement is certainly feasi-
ble; Lyon concedes that many jurisdictions follow this practice.'30
Given this flexibility, if failure to record an investigatory interview
leaves substantial uncertainty about how the interview was conducted,
courts should not generally resolve that uncertainty in favor of the
prosecution. 3 1
Second, the fact that the first contact giving rise to a suspicion of
abuse is most often with parents or teachers, not with official investiga-
tors, is cause for concern rather than for comfort. Official investiga-
tors may be trained to avoid suggestiveness; most parents and teachers
are not. Remarkably, Lyon asserts that "[p]arents are unlikely to pur-
sue the hypothesis that a spouse or a brother has abused their
child."13 2 Obviously, this is often true-and just as obviously it is
sometimes not true.13 3 The data on parental support show great di-
versity in parental reactions to the suspicion of child abuse by their
current or former partners. 34 Many experts can cite cases-in acri-
monious custody disputes, for example-in which one parent is ac-
cused of coaching the child against the other parent.'3 5 We do not
know what percentage of custody cases involve such acrimony, but
clearly many do. Even if this percentage is very low, it would neverthe-
less amount to many cases, given the large number of custody dis-
putes. Moreover, suggestive questioning by a parent or teacher-an
important and influential person to the child-may yield more false
positive statements than questioning by an investigator whom the
child does not know.
Having stated these threshold points, we will now concentrate on
the question of the frequency of suggestive techniques in formal inves-
tigations. Of course, child advocates do not deny that investigators
130 IM. at 1026. We argue in favor of the practice infra, Part III.E.
'3' Cf Commonwealth v. Allen, 665 N.E.2d 105, 108-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (noting
that "neither the initial interview, nor [most of the] subsequent interview... were video-
taped or recorded, and that, without such recordings, it is difficult for the defendant to
substantiate an offer of proof in support of a request for a pretrial competency hearing"
(footnote omitted)).
132 Lyon, New IVav4 supra note 2, at 1032.
133 See, eg., D. Convin &E. Olafson, Videotaped Discove, of a Reportedly Unreallab!e Aar,-
oiy of Child Sexual Abuse: Comparison with a Cldldhood Intertview Wideotaped 11 Years Before, 2
Cnm. MAILTRATnmrr 91, 92 (1997) (reporting admission on tape by a child witness that
her mother and grandmother pressured her to make a false claim against her father).
134 See the studies cited by Lyon, New Wxve, supra note 2, at 1056 nn.28S8-9. Although
many mothers do not support their children's disclosures of abuse, many are supportive,
especially if the defendant is an estranged husband or partner rather than a current one.
See id at 1056-57. In many studies, the support rate is between 50% and 85%. &e id. at
1056 nn.288-89.
135 This is Ced's personal observation from discussion with clinical experts.
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frequently question children suggestively. 136 Indeed, much of their
argument is that some forms of suggestive questioning are necessary
and involve little risk.137 Any question that articulates a specific pro-
position and asks the child to confirm or deny it must be considered
suggestive to a considerable degree. Thus, Lyon concedes that "'lead-
ing' questions are certainly common in investigative interviews."13
But child advocates do contend that there is no basis for concluding
that the stronger forms of suggestiveness are common.1 39
First, consider the mere fact of repetitive questioning, which, as
we have shown, can in itself (and in conjunction with other suggestive
techniques) be a powerful producer of false positives.140 Myers chides
Ceci and Bruck for contending that the norm is multiple interviews-
though deep in a footnote he "fully concede[s] that too many chil-
dren are interviewed too many times by too many professionals." 4
Such evidence as exists suggests strongly that multiple interviews by
government agents, for both social services and law enforcement, are
very common. 142 Of course, those interviews almost inevitably follow
at least one conversation that the child had with a parent, teacher, or
another familiar adult.143 Indeed, Myers contends that "[i]n quite a
few cases, multiple interviews are necessary," precisely because
"[m] any children who have been abused do not disclose their abuse
during the first interview."'144
136 See, e.g., Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1036 ("In sum, the limited observatioial
research on real-world interviews demonstrates that interviewers ask few open-ended ques.
tions, many specific questions and some leading questions." (footnote omitted)).
137 See, e.g., id. at 1064-68.
138 Id. at 1042.
139 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
141 Myers, New Era, supra note 2, at 395 n.53 (citations omitted).
142 Some of the evidence on multiple interviews is summarized in Stephen J. Ceci et
al., Childrens Allegations of SexualAbuse: Forensic and Sdentiflc Issues: A Reply to Commentators, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 494, 500-01 (1995). Neither Myers nor anybody else presents
any evidence suggesting that multiple interviews are not the norm. Myers does report one
study of a hospital-based, multidisciplinary child interview center that succeeded in reduc-
ing multiple interviews, so that 80% of the children interviewed there were interviewed
only once. MYzRs, supra note 49, § 1.31, at 73-74. A study of another multidisciplinary
investigation program, however, revealed no change in the number of interviews. See id,
§ 1.31, at 72-73; see also Myers, New Era, supra note 2, at 395 n.53 (citing a report by the
California Attorney General's Office that "describ[es] pilot projects that succeeded in redue-
ing the number of interviews" (emphases added)). Suchjoint investigations may eventually
become a major factor in reducing multiple interviews, but they have not yet. And, even if
only 20% of children were subjected to multiple interviews, that would still be a significant
problem.
143 Cf MyEm, supra note 49, § 1.27, at 63 ("When a child finally discloses abuse, the
child may tell a friend, parent, teacher, school counselor, or other professional." (foot-
notes omitted)).
144 Id. § 1.32, at 78 & n.367.
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Now consider the substance of the interviews. Ceci and Bruck
discuss some notorious cases involving allegations of abuse in day-care
centers, in which the persistent use of highly suggestive techniques is
apparent beyond question. 45 Lyon's response is essentially one of
confession and avoidance: he contends that investigators are more
likely to use highly suggestive techniques in the day-care cases than in
the more typical case charging abuse against only one child. 146 He is
right, of course, that if a case involves only one alleged victim-the
most common type of case, but not the only significant type, and not
clearly the type that covers a majority of the alleged victims14 7-peer
pressure techniques will ordinarily not be available.148 Beyond that,
however, his argument is very thin.149 He asserts speculatively that
"[i]nterviewers who are confident that the children have suffered
abuse are more likely to question extensively a child in a multivictim
case than in a single-victim case."' 50 That is not at all dear;, if more
children are potential sources of information, the time spent ith
each child might diminish, even if the case becomes more important.
Moreover, one might think that in light of the bizarre allegations
made in some cases involving multiple children, fair-minded investiga-
tors would not have been so confident that the children suffered
145 See CEci & BRUCK, supra note 11, at 178-80 (giving one of many documented exam-
ples presented in that volume).
146 Lyon, New 11ve, supra note 2, at 1032.
147 According to figures Lyon cites, about 85% of criminal sexual abuse cases charge
the defendant with abusing a single child, another 11% of the cases name two victims, and
5% of the cases name three or more victims. Id. at 1031 n.141. Even if all 5% of the cases
in the last (three-or-more) category involved three victims rather than four or more, this
would nevertheless mean that 37 of 122 alleged victims (30%) were involved in multivictim
indictments. But of course a few of the cases in the three-or-more category involve very
large numbers of children, which means that the total percentage of alleged victims in-
volved in multivictim indictments is over 30%. Moreover, Lyon acknowledges that, accord-
ing to his source, in 22% of the cases in which a defendant ,vas charged with assaulting a
single child, there were allegations of abuse against other children that were not charged.
Id. Thus, it appears from these figures that an actual majority of the suspected victims of
abuse are involved in cases in which there is at least one other suspected victim.
148 Lyon cites a study byAmye Warren and her colleagues as showing that only three of
forty-two interviews used peer pressure techniques. Id. at 1033. Most of Warren's cases
involved only a single child, however, and so no peer claims about the alleged abuse were
available to interviewers. See Amye R. Warren et al., "It Sounds Good in Theory, But. .. '" Do
Investigative Intervwers Follow Guidelines Based on Memory Research?, I CHiLD NALTmrE AthENr
231, 233 (1996). Of those cases involving a peer, the use of peer pressure tactics was no
doubt far higher.
149 It is in this context that Lyon contends that "[p]arents are unlikely to pursue the
hypothesis that a spouse or a brother has abused their child," Lyon, New llhte, supra note 2,
at 1032, an argument to which we have responded above. Similarly, lie contends that "in-
terviewers are not likely to paint negative stereotypes of those uith whom die child may
wish to maintain an ongoing relationship." Id.
150 Id. at 1031.
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abuse. 151 Lyon also argues that "[t]he median age of a sexual abuse
victim in criminal court is thirteen years of age, while the day-care
cases predominantly involved preschool children." 5 2 But this misses
the point. No one contends-and surely we do not-that the re-
search on preschool children is a guide to suggestibility in adoles-
cents. The preschool research is of substantial use only in cases
involving preschool children-but those cases are very numerous.153
In fact, three- to five-year-olds are the single highest incidence group
for substantiated sexual abuse (more than five out of every 1000).t54
In sum, a very large number of cases are multivictim cases involving
preschool-aged children, notwithstanding Lyon's suggestions to the
contrary.
Now narrow the focus to the question of principal interest to
Lyon, the use of leading questions in cases involving a single alleged
victim. Lyon perceives a whipsaw manipulation of the term "leading
question": "When discussing the real world, the new wave uses the
term broadly [but] in describing their own research, the new wave
uses the term quite narrowly."155 In other words, he suggests that
some researchers have used narrow definitions of leading questions to
show that they have large consequences, and then broad definitions to
show that they are used frequently in the real world.
It is true that there is no consistent taxonomy in the research
literature; different studies attach different meanings to terms such as
"leading," "suggestive," "focused," "open-ended," "closed," and "di-
rect." Ultimately, however, this definitional matter is of little impor-
tance. Our analysis of Goodman's studies has shown that even mild
suggestiveness-which is plainly a pervasive interviewing tech-
nique:56-can have more than a trivial impact.15 7 Furthermore, re-
search on the actual practices of interviewers has shown that some
frequently used techniques are highly suggestive by any definition and
raise a particularly high danger of false positives in light of suggestibil-
ity research. Examples of highly suggestive interviewing techniques
may be found very readily, even in the pages of the United States Re.
151 See CECI & BRuCK, supra note 11, at 10 (detailing such allegations as "being taken by
boat and thrown overboard into a school of circling sharks").
152 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1032 (footnote omitted).
153 See supra note 1.
154 SEDLAK & BROADHURST, supra note 1, at 4-13 fig.4-6.
155 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1037.
156 See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
157 See supra Part I.B.3.
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ports.158 We will concentrate, however, on three sets of studies Lyon
discusses.' 59
In analyzing these studies, Lyon focuses on the ratio of suggestive
questions to all questions asked by an interviewer.160 This ratio, how-
ever, is of very limited significance. After all, a single strong sugges-
tion can damage the accuracy of a child's report. Furthermore,
surrounding it with a long series of non-suggestive questions is not
likely to diminish its deleterious impact. Even if only 5% of all ques-
tions asked by a real-world interviewer are suggestive, this may never-
theless mean that all interviews contain at least one strong suggestion.
Thus, the ratio of suggestive to nonsuggestive questions is far less use-
ful as a metric than the total proportion of interviews in which at least
some serious suggestion was made or the average number of sugges-
tive questions per interview. We will nevertheless discuss the former
metric to some extent, for two reasons. First, it is one that some of the
studies assess. Second, if this ratio is more than trivial, it clearly indi-
cates a high probability that an interview includes one or more sugges-
tive questions.
a. Warren
Lyon argues that Amye Warren and her colleagues, who studied
transcripts of interviews conducted by child protection service workers
158 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 808, 810-11 (1990) (relating an interview in which a
pediatrician asked a 2 1/2-year-old child. "Do you play with daddy?" "Does daddy play with
you?" "Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee?" "Do you touch his pee-pee?").
159 Lyon also cites a study, Barbara W. Boat & Mark D. Everson, ConalrringPrad ices of
Interviewers When UsingAnatomical Dolls in Child Prottie Semices Investigations, 1 CMt.D MaU,
TREATem-rr 96 (1996), which he says reports that interviewers using anatomical dolls never
"asked the child to show how abuse might have occurred" in ninety-seven interview . See
Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1034 & n.156; Boat & Everson, supra, at 101 & tblA. This
citation is at least potentially misleading. True, the interviews-only eighty-one of which
actually included use of dolls-contained no instances of certain troublesome practices,
such as the introduction of fantasy or conjecture by the interviewer (e.g., "If someone has
hurt a little girl's bottom, show me how he would do it.") when using the dolls as an ireaPe,.
Id. This may be the basis for Lyon's contention that this study supports the proposition
that guided imagery is uncommon in practice. But in fact most of the interviewers asked
the children to use the doll to demonstrate how abuse occurred-not in itself a trouble-
some practice-and a high percentage of the interviews did include practices that the au-
thors regarded as troublesome. For example, among the forty-five interviews uith two- to
five-year-old children in which the interviewers used the dolls, 29% used the dolls prema.
turely, and 20% used play language that might encourage fantasy (ag., "We can play like
this is you."). In one of the forty-five cases, the interviewer asked for a demonstration with
the aid of the doll before the child had made a verbal disclosure. Id. at 100.01 & tbl.6.
Also in one of the cases, the interviewer introduced fantasy or conjecture to assess a child's
labels for or understanding of anatomy. Id. at 101 tbl.5. Overall, Boat & Everson express a
tone of concern; although the frequency of troublesome practices does not support dis-
continuing use of the dolls, they believe that the frequency of improper use indicates the
need for better training. Id. at 103.
160 See Lyon, New Iave, supra note 2, at 1036.
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in a southern state, found only relatively innocuous leading ques-
tions. 16' But, according to Warren herself, this is a misinterpretation
of her findings.' 62 Warren says that she wrote the article Lyon cites in
a cautious manner; published in the journal of the American Profes-
sional Society on the Abuse of Children (APSAC),' 63 it attempted to
avoid sensationalism so as not to put its audience on the defensive, in
the hope that some mild suggestions for improving practices would be
adopted. Moreover, the article was primarily devoted to an examina-
tion of interviewers' usage of recommended practices rather than
their avoidance of improper techniques. The article directly analyzed
only one particular problem, the provision of new, potentially leading
information that the child had not disclosed in the same interview.1 64
Thus, the authors did not intend the article to be a comprehensive
listing of their findings, nor a list of the most serious errors these re-
searchers have found. Even in this article, however, Warren and her
colleagues gave examples of suggestive questioning that could hardly
be deemed innocuous. Thus, they reported that "three interviewers
on their second attempt used a potentially highly suggestive method
by stating that someone else had told them that something had hap-
pened to, or that someone had touched or hurt, the child, and then
followed with 'Do you remember?' or 'Can you think about that?"''' 65
And they concluded that "[f] ewer than half of our interviewers intro-
161 Id. at 1034-35.
162 See E-mail from Amye Warren to StephenJ. Ceci (Sept. 7, 1999, 12:01:44) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Warren E-mail]. Warren said that she was "distressed" on read-
ing the section of Lyon's work describing her findings and Lamb's:
I think his description of our findings is a misinterpretation. We (Nancy
Walker and I) tried to be so cautious in our description of the interviews so
that we would not be perceived as attacking-we did not want the audience
to become defensive--our hope being that they might be motivated to put
some of these better practices to use. So in fact we never even attempted to
classify all the questions as leading versus not, nor did we provide some of
the worst examples of leading questions. We purposely avoided being "sen-
sationalistic". Instead, Nancy and her student looked at the interviewers'
"provision of new, POTENTIALLY leading, information" that had not been
previously disclosed by the child in the same interview. And we acknowl-
edged that sometimes that information was innocuous-like the child's
name or the names of her brothers and sisters, etc. We also said that refer-
ring to what the child said in a prior interview IS problematic-because if
the child was led in a prior interview, then asking them to say what they said
again would be repeating the errors. But I do NOT believe, by any means,
that this is a "worst case scenario" of leading questioning, as Lyon has repre-
sented this example. Having looked through these interviews again, I have
found worse, obviously suggestive questions.
Id.
163 See Warren et al., supra note 148. APSAC describes itself as "the nation's largest
interdisciplinary professional society for those who work in the field of child maltreat-
ment," with its aim being "to ensure that everyone affected by child maltreatment receives
the best possible professional response." MYERs, supra note 49, § 1.38, at 119 n.*.
164 See Warren E-mail, supra note 162.
165 Warren et al., supra note 148, at 238.
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duced the abuse-questioning phase in a general, open-ended fashion
designed to elicit a narrative response, and some introductory tech-
niques could be perceived as highly suggestive." 166
Elsewhere, Warren and her associates have described even more
serious errors made by their interviewers than the examples listed in
the article Lyon discusses. 167 To summarize, Warren's interviewers
provided details not previously provided by the child, including ones
that concern the alleged abuse; they created an atmosphere of accusa-
166 Id, at 239.
167 The following are two examples of the many suggestions that these interviewers
employed-
Interviewer (I): Who else's wiener have you seen?
Child (C): Mine.
I: You don't have one. You're bein' silly again.... Did S. touch (you) idth his
wiener?
Amye Warren, Interiewing Child Witnesses: Some Linguistic Considerations #21, at 8-9, invited
presentation at the NATO Advanced Studies Institute on the Child Witness in Context:
Social, Cognitive, and Legal Perspectives, I1 Ciocco, Italy (May, 1992).
I: We're gonna go see him sometime, Policeman Bob. Do you know why we're
gonna go see him?
C: [Nods]
I: Why?
C: [Shrugs]
I: 'Cause I want you to tell him about Mr. L Do you know why I want you to tell
him?
C: [Nods]
I: Why?
C: [Shrugs]
I: 'Cause I don't want Mr. L doin' that to anybody else. And we have to tell a
policeman. Do you know that?
C: [Nods]
I: We have to tell a policeman what Mr. L did. But my question is do we need
to tell the policeman about anybody else?
C: [Shakes head no]
I: Do we need to tell the policeman about Miss D.?
C: Mnn-hmmm [yes].
I: What do you want to tell him?
C: About [unintelligible]
I: Well now they already know about her, so we don't need to talk any more
about her. She did bad things, and then we told the police, and we've told the
police about the bad things Mr. L did to your tootle. But is there anything
else we need to tell him?
c [Shrugs]
I: 'Cause we're not gonna tell him about Ro. cause he's a little kid and we're not
gonna get him in trouble.
Id., #24, at 3. Some of the interviewer behaviors revealed in these exchanges are dearly
troublesome, but Warren and her associates do not discuss them in the article to which
Lyon refers, in part because suggestive questioning wias not the primary focus of the analy-
ses conducted for the article. Additional examples of highly suggestive techniques occur in
other of Warren's works. See id.; Amye R. Warren et al., Intenieuing Cdildren: Questions of
Structure and Style, presented at the 3d National Colloquium of the American Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children, Tucson, AZ (June 1995); Amye I Warren et al., Inter-
viewing Child Witnesses: B eyond Leading Questiod Biennial Meeting of the American Psy-
chology Law Society, San Diego, CA (March 1992).
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tion by alluding to the bad nature of the defendant; they invoked peer
pressure; and they sometimes raised negative consequences, such as
calling a child silly, when her answers deviated from expectation.
Nearly all the interviews in this sample contained suggestions, and the
majority of the interviewers asked questions that could be considered
problematic. 168
b. Lamb
In one of a series of studies, Michael Lamb and his colleagues
examined interviews by Israeli investigators with alleged sexual abuse
victims.' 69 They found that only about 2% of the utterances invited
open-ended responses from the child.'70 About 25% of the utter-
ances were leading questions, defined as questions that "focus the
child's attention on details or aspects of the account that the child has
not previously mentioned, but do not imply that a particular response
168 Recently, Warren and her colleagues have presented a paper, based on the same
interview transcripts, that in their view provides some support for Lyon's contention that
the most egregious practices are used only rarely in "typical" cases. Amye R. Warren, et al,,
Setting the Record Straight: How Problematic Are "Typical" Child Sexual Abuse Interviews? (unpub-
lished manuscript, March 2000, on file with authors). This paper certainly supports the
proposition that their typical interview contained fewer egregious practices than the most
notorious interviews in the McMartin and Kelly Michaels cases, a point that we have never
disputed. But the data revealed in this paper indicate that some particularly troublesome
techniques, though usually constituting a small part of the interaction in any given inter-
view, are extremely common. Perhaps most strikingly, the interviewers invoked negative
consequences, such as telling the child "you haven't told us anything," in twenty-eight of
the forty-two interviews, or 67%. In forty of the interviews, or 95%, the interviewer re-
peated a question, in an attempt to elicit a new answer, even though the child had unam-
biguously answered the question in the immediately preceding portion of the interview. In
five of the interviews, or 12%, the interviewer told the child about information received
from another person. In 37 interviews, or 88%, the interviewer invoked positive conse-
quences on at least one occasion for an answer, though the researchers report that this
occurred mainly in the context of the early, rapport-building part of the interview. And in
fourteen interviews, or 33%, the interviewer invited the child to speculate about past events
or to use imagination or solve a mystery. All of these techniques have been shown by re-
search to be extremely problematic, and this new data by Warren and her colleagues
reveals that they are present in anywhere from 12%-95% of all interviews. Furthermore,
these authors offer several caveats: the interviews, provided by an agency, may not be typi-
cal; the coding rules were strictly applied, and while they may have registered some vioa-
tions that were probably harmless "conversational conventions," they also missed some
potentially more harmful errors; and, most importantly, as we have argued above, the fre-
quency or infrequency of a particular problematic technique in a given interview does not
mean that the use of that technique had little impact. Indeed, a single use of some of the
techniques listed above is capable in some circumstances of distorting the entire interview.
Finally, nothing in the recent paper undercuts the findings described above that Warren
and her colleagues made in earlier papers concerning the use of other suggestive
techniques.
169 Michael E. Lamb et al., Effects of Investigative Utterance Types on Israeli Childrents Re-
sponses, 19 INT'LJ. BEHAv. Dxv. 627 (1996).
170 Id. at 631-32, 633 tbl.1.
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is expected."171 About 9% of the utterances-an average of more
than fourteen per interview-were "suggestive" in that they implied a
desired response or assumed details that the child had not pro-
vided. 172 An example from their research of a suggestive question is,
"He forced you to do that, didn't he?"173 Lamb and his colleagues
obtained similar results in studying interview samples from the United
States,174 as well as from other Israeli samples. 175 The exact results
differed from study to study and within each study depending on the
conditions under which the interviews were held. But, as Lyon ac-
knowledges, a typical interview across these studies contained between
five and ten suggestive statements. 176
171 Id. at 631, 633 tbl.1.
172 Id. at 631, 633 tbL1.
173 Id. at 631.
174 See Michael E. Lamb et al., Investigative Interiews of Alleged Sexual Abuse Vclims with
and Ihout Anatomical Dos, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLEcT 1251 (1996); Kathleen J. Stern-
berg et al., The Relation Between Investigalive Utterance Tpes and the Informativeness of Child
VIrtnesses, 17J. APp= Dav. PsvcuoL. 439 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Imestigatite
Utterance Types]; Kathleen J. Steinberg et al, Using a Scripted Protocol in Investigative Inter-
views: A Pilot Study, 3 APpLuD DEy. Sci. 70 (1999) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Scripted
Protocol].
175 See Irt Hershkowitz & Aline Elul, The Effeds of hivestigale Ullerantes on Isradi Chill.
drens Reports of PhysicalAbus, 3 A su.D DEV. Sci. 28 (1999); Yael Orbach et al., Assessing the
Value of Structured Protocols forForensic Interdews ofAlegrd Child Abuse idims 24 C,-uw AnusE
& NEGLECr 733 (2000); Sternberg et al., supra note 51.
176 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1036. Kathleen Steinberg and her colleagues
conducted a pilot study analyzing investigatory sexual abuse interviews conducted by a
sheriff's office in an urban area of a southern state in the United States. Steinberg et al.,
Scipted Protoco4 supra note 174, at 71. Investigators who were already experienced in inter-
viewing child sexual abuse victims participated in intensive training seminars, lasting ap-
proximately forty hours, to learn one of two types of protocols. One of these relied on
open-ended questions in the opening phases of the interview and the other used directed
questions. Id. at 71-72. Steinberg then compared interviews conducted by these interniew-
ers before and after the training and found that, although training reduced the number of
directive and leading utterances used in the substantive phase of the interview, neither
type of training significantly reduced the number of suggestive utterances used. Se id. at
74-75. Prior to training, an average of 9.33 of the interviewers' substantive utterances per
interview, or 8.0% of all their substantive utterances, were suggestive. Id. at 74 tbl.2. Fol-
lowing training in the directed protocol, they used an average of 8.5 suggestive utterances
(11.7% of all their substantive utterances) per interview, and with the open-ended protocol
the average number of suggestive utterances was 7.33 per interview (9.9%). Id. The re-
searchers found that interviewers who did not adhere to a protocol "obtained most of the
information from the children using leading and suggestive questions" and that about 50%
of the post-training interviews "could not be included because the interviewers did not
adhere to the protocol." Id. at 74-75.
In another study, interviewers using anatomical dolls made an average of 8.00 sugges-
tive utterances per interview (8.2% of the total), while interviewers not using the dolls
made an average of 4.88 suggestive utterances per interview (7.2%). Lamb et al., supra
note 174, at 1255 thl.1.
Other studies by Lamb and those who have worked ith him also have found that
interviewers make several suggestive utterances per interview, between 5 and 10% of all
their utterances. See, e-g., Hershkowitz & Elul, supra note 175, at 31 thl.2 (3.2; 6.7%);
Orbach et al., supra note 175, at 741 tbls.1 & 2 (9.1; 10%); Steinberg et al., Imesigatle
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Lyon belittles the significance of this research on several grounds.
First, he suggests that leading questions in these studies are not troub-
lesome because they do not imply that the interviewer expects a par-
ticular response. 177 But given that a leading question, by definition,
articulates a proposition that the interviewee had not previously ar-
ticulated, it almost inevitably suggests to the interviewee that the ques-
tioner regards the proposition as plausible.' 78
Second, Lyon appears to argue that the relatively low proportion
of suggestive questions means that the use of these questions is not a
troubling factor. 7 9 Once again, however, the ratio of suggestive ques-
tions to all questions asked is a statistic of very little significance.
Rather, the critical factor is that, both before and after being trained
in the protocol, the interviewers studied by Lamb and his colleagues
used a significant number of suggestive questions per interview. 180
Given Lamb's narrow definition of suggestion as a statement implying
a favored reply from the child,' 8 ' even a single instance could call into
doubt the validity of an interview-and all the more so the five to ten
such instances that are typical of the interviews Lamb studied.182
Third, Lyon says that "[t]he data do not reveal the extent to
which the suggestive questions elicited details of the alleged abuse."'u8
We confess to being mystified by this assertion. Not only do Lamb
and his colleagues state the number of suggestive inquiries per inter-
view in most of their studies, but they also report explicitly the average
number of details related to the alleged abuse that children provided
in response to each type of utterance. 8 4 In a study on Israeli chil-
Utterance Types, supra note 174, at 446 tbl.2 (9.5; 8.7% for multiple incident abuse invcstga-
tions; 9.9% for single incident).
177 Lyon, New Wav4 supra note 2, at 1035.
178 The same point applies to questions Warren and her colleagues classify as specific
because they do not require a narrative response. In the studies by Lamb and his col-
leagues, leading questions only focused on new topics. See, e.g., Lamb et al., supra note 174,
at 1254.
179 See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1036 ("In sum, the limited observational re-
search on real-world interviews demonstrates that interviewers ask few open-ended ques-
tions, many specific questions, and some leading questions." (footnote omitted)).
180 See, e.g., Stemberg et al., Scripted Protocoi supra note 174, at 74 tbl.2.
181 Throughout their writings, Lamb and his colleagues define suggestive utterances as
those "stated in such a way that the interviewer strongly communicates what response is
expected (e.g., 'He forced you to do that, didn't he?')." Lamb et al., supra note 169, at 631;
Sternberg et al., Scripted Protocol supra note 174, at 73.
182 See, e.g., Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1036.
183 Id. (footnote omitted).
184 E.g., Sternberg et al., Investigative Utterance Types, supra note 174, at 447 tbl.3. The
studies speak of "details" but limit the term to those that are abuse-related. E.g., id. at 444
("By definition, details involved the identification of individuals or objects, descriptions of
their appearance or actions, and descriptions of relevant events or actions.... Details were
only counted when they added to understanding of the target incidents and their disclo.
sure."); see also E-mail from Michael E. Lamb to StephenJ. Ceci (July 26, 1999) (confirming
that suggestive questions "almost always elicit a detail" and that, per the published defini-
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dren, for example, in which they report an average of more than four-
teen suggestive interviewer utterances per interview,18 5 they also
report an average of 2.02 details per suggestive utterance' 86-a figure
that is typical across their studies.18 7 In addition, Lamb and his col-
leagues make very dear that suggestive questions were a principal ba-
sis on which the interviewers in these studies elicited abuse-related
information. 188
Finally, Lyon contends that the Israeli investigators involved in
Lamb's study were not adequately trained;18 9 his implication is that
American interviewers are better trained, and so the rate of error in
the United States would be lower. But Lyon bases this assertion on an
essay by Sternberg, Lamb, and their colleagues that discusses the
evolution of investigative procedures in Israel. 190 This essay has no
bearing on the actual research studies from which Steinberg and her
colleagues took their data. The specific Israeli investigators who par-
ticipated in the research studies were better educated, better trained,
and more experienced than any sample that has been studied in the
United States of which we are aware.191 One cannot shrug Lamb's
results aside by suggesting that they are a result of the inexperience of
the interviewers.
don, only "pieces of information that are related to the alleged abuse" are counted as
details).
185 Lamb et al., supra note 169, at 633 thl.1.
186 Id. at 634 tbl.2.
187 Steinberg and her associates report a mean of 1.95 details per suggestive inter-
viewer utterance. Steinberg et al., Investigative Utterance Type; supra note 174, at 447 tbl.3.
Given the average of 9.5 suggestive interviewer utterances per interview, this means an
average of approximately 18.5 details per interview elicited by suggestive questions. In
another study, they report 2.37 details per suggestive question for those interviewers who
used direct questions to a significant degree near the beginning of the interiew, and 2.31
details per suggestive question for those who began the interview ith open-ended ques-
tions. Steinberg et al., supra note 51, at 1140 tbl.3. Lamb and his associates report 1.35
details per suggestive question for those interviews conducted with anatomical dolls and
1.64 details per suggestive question for those interviews conducted without the dolls.
Lamb et al., supra note 174, at 1256 thl.2. These figures correspond respectively to about
10.8 and 8.0 details per interview elicited by suggestive questions.
188 See, e.g., Sternberg et al., Scripted Protoco supra note 174, at 74 ("Interviewers ob-
tained most of the information from the children using leading and suggestive
questions.").
189 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1035 n.167.
190 See KatleenJ. Steinberg et al., Child Sexual Abuse Investigations in Israel: Evaluating
Innovative Practice; in LNTERAroAL PERsPEc-IES ON CHILD ABtSE AND CHILDREN'S TEr n.
moNY 62, 69 (Bette L Bottoms & Gail S. Goodman eds., 1996) [hereinafter Steinberg et
al., Evaluating Innovative Practices]; see also Kathleen J. Steinberg et al., Child &Sxual Abuse
Investigations in Israel, 23 CRt. JUsT. & BEHamv. 322 (1996). The first paper describes the
problems that the Israeli Youth Investigation had faced from its inception in 1955. &e
Sternberg et al., Evaluating Innovative Practices supra, at 63-66.
191 See Lamb et al., supra note 169, at 629. Note also the extensive training that the
investigators in the Scripted Protocol study received. See Steinberg et al., Scripted Protocl,
supra note 174, at 71-72.
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In short, Lamb and his colleagues, working across very different
samples in two nations, have consistently documented the extensive
use of strongly suggestive techniques by experienced investigative in-
terviewers and the extent to which those techniques elicit statements
about alleged abuse from children. Indeed, we believe that any fair-
minded reader will recognize that a principal theme of these studies is
that, even after extensive training, abuse interviewers tend to secure
too much information from leading and suggestive questions. 02 In
contrast to the impression given by Lyon, the research of Lamb and
his colleagues is a source of concern rather than of solace.
c. Yuille
Lyon attempts to dismiss the findings by John Yuille and his col-
leagues of serious interviewer errors193 by pointing out that the pub-
lished account of the study that he cites does not give details of these
errors. 194 But a reprint describing the study in detail fills in the
gap.195 Yuille and his colleagues asked "blind" raters to evaluate vide-
otaped interviews of two groups of professional interviewers, one that
had been trained in Yuille's own interviewing methods and one that
was traditionally trained. 96 The differences between the two groups
were so obvious that Yuille's blind raters knew within the first few min-
utes of viewing each video whether the interviewer had been trained
in Yuille's techniques or not.197 For the traditionally-trained inter-
viewers, there were so many leading questions that it was often impos-
sible to assess the child's credibility. 198 Thus, as with the Lamb and
Warren studies, the findings by Yuille and his colleagues show not
only that highly suggestive techniques are common, but that they fre-
quently result in serious problems for those who evaluate the
interviews.
192 These researchers do offer hope that a scripted protocol may reduce interviewers'
reliance on leading and suggestive questions. See Sternberg et al., Scripted Protoco supra
note 174, at 74. It is important to note that some of the papers discussed above were not
available to Lyon when he wrote his article.
193 SeeJohn C. Yuille et al., The Nature of Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, in TRUE AND
FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT 21 (Tara
Ney ed., 1995).
194 Lyons, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1036 & n.176.
195 JOHN C. YUILLE, MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SERVICES, PROVINCE OF B RISH COLUMBIA, IM
PROVING INVESTIGATIONS INTO ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1995); E-mail from
John Yuille to StephenJ. Ceci (July 28, 1999, 13:22:01) (on file with author Ceci) (herein-
after Yuille E-mail].
196 Yuille E-mail, supra note 195.
197 Id.
198 Id.
[Vol. 86:33
TE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHfLREN
C. Summary
We have shown that the dominant view for over a century has
been that young children are highly suggestible. Studies on which
child advocates rely do not disprove this fact. On the contrary, they
reveal levels of suggestibility-with regard to abuse-related questions
as well as others-that create potential difficulties for an adjudicative
system assessing children's allegations of abuse. Moreover, when in-
vestigators use strongly suggestive techniques, children's suggestibility
is even more marked-and research indicates quite clearly that inter-
viewers use strongly suggestive techniques quite often.
Despite the attempt of child advocates to cast researchers such as
Ceci as the benighted challengers of children's credibility, there is ac-
tually relatively little dispute over how vulnerable children are to vari-
ous degrees of suggestion. Instead, the disputes tend to concern
whether the emphasis should be on the degree to which children are
suggestible or the degree to which they are not, how suggestive inter-
viewers are in practice, and the proper attitude of the legal system
towards suggestibility. In the next Part, we present a framework for
considering the legal implications of the suggestibility research.
II
A FRANawoRK FOR ANALYSIS OF LEGAL IMPUCATIONS
In Part I, we discussed what scientific research shows about how
plausibly a child may be led by suggestion to making a false allegation
of sexual abuse. In this Part, we present a framework for thinking
about the legal implications of this research.
Litigation often concerns the proof of uncertain, hotly-contested
events. However satisfactorily the adjudicative system determines the
facts, some uncertainty will remain when the time for decision arrives.
Thus, as Lyon points out, errors of two types are inherent in litiga-
tion. 99 In the context of concern to us here, afalsepositiveis the error
that arises when abuse did not occur but the system concludes that it
did, and a false negative is the corresponding error that arises when
abuse did occur but the system concludes that it did not. In choosing
among legal rules or systems, the principal question is not what the
overall ratio of these two types of errors should be, but rather what the
tradeoff between the error types should be-that is, how many addi-
tional false negatives is it worthwhile to create in order to prevent a
false positive?200
199 See Lyon, New wve, supra note 2, at 1013.
200 See idU; cf. Michael L DeKay, The Difference Between Bladastone-Lihe Error Ratios and
Probabilistic Standards of Proof 21 L ,w & Soc. NouiRy 95, 131 (1996) (pointing out that
convicting only on 10:1 odds of guilt will. not necessarily yield a 10:1 ratio of false negatives
to false positives).
20001
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Lyon regards it as "remarkabl[e]" to conclude that it is better to
let 100 guilty people go free than to convict one innocent person.2 01
In Section A of this Part, however, we argue that that there is good
reason to adhere to the traditional-and constitutionally man-
dated 2 2-principle that in the criminal context false positives are
deemed far worse than false negatives. Indeed, a ratio of about 100:1
may well square with deeply-held senses of social value, as well as with
constitutional standards articulated by the Supreme Court.2 03 Thus, a
very high standard of persuasion is appropriate. That is, for a convic-
tion to be warranted, the fact-finder must be satisfied to a very high
degree of confidence that the defendant is guilty.
Section B of this Part presents a method, using simple Bayesian
probability, for assessing the significance of individual items of evi-
dence, in particular a child's allegation of sexual abuse. We show that
if there is a substantial probability that the child would not make the
allegation even though it were true, this diminishes the probative value
of the evidence. Moreover, if a given item is crucial to the prosecu-
tion-as the child's allegation is in many sexual abuse cases-then
even a small probability that the child would make the allegation even
though it were false has great significance, as does even a small mis-
judgment in assessing that probability.
Section C of this Part then discusses how the choice of legal rules
should take into account the respective possibilities of false positives
and of false negatives. Once again, the large difference in the gravity
of the two types of error plays a critical role. But, at least arguably, a
rule-maker might also let the selection of cases enter into the calcula-
tion; if most of those defendants to whom a given rule is to be applied
are in fact guilty, then that may be a factor weighing in favor of choos-
ing a pro-prosecution rule. We argue that even if this is so, and even if
the large majority of defendants charged with child sexual abuse are
in fact guilty, the selection of rules in this area must nevertheless re-
flect great sensitivity to the creation of false positives.
We caution that, in making the arguments in this Part, we do not
mean to suggest that a numerical analysis or any numerical formula
should be presented to juries. We do believe, however, that use of
Bayesian decision theory for heuristic purposes can sharpen analysis
for legal decision makers.
201 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1075-76.
202 See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). The Supreme Court his
found this principle in the Due Process Clause. See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
203 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.
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A. Social Utility and the Standard of Persuasion
We begin with a simple model. Suppose that an adjudicator-
combining the roles of lawmaker and fact-finder-has to decide
whether to treat an accused as innocent or as guilty. After considering
all the evidence, the adjudicator assesses the probability of guilt as
some number Py between 0 and 1; thus the probability of innocence,
Pt, is 1 -Py. 20 4 Oy, or the odds of guilt, is equal to Py 1 (1 - Py), a
positive number between zero and infinity. How confident should the
adjudicator be-that is, how large should the adjudicator assess Oy to
be-for her to treat the accused as guilty? It is easy to show that the
adjudicator should treat the accused as guilty if and only if
EpOy>: p (1)
En,
where Ep and En are the social costs, respectively, of a false positive
and a false negative.20 5 We will call this fraction, the standard of per-
204 We speak of the adjudicator's assessment of probabilities and odds because ue are
applying Bayesian decision theory, in which probabilities or odds represent an actor's sub-
jective level of confidence in the truth of a proposition. In other words, wve are not assum-
ing that the probability of a given proportion is objectively determinable.
In accordance with convention, we are using Greek subscripts for matters over which a
decision maker has no control, and Latin ones for matters over which a decision maker
does have control.
205 See Richard D. Friedman, Anmering the Bayesioslwptical Challenge, 1 Ir'LJ. EiDF-xcE
& PROOF 276, 277-78 (1997) (presenting a proof of this statement); see also Richard 0.
Lempert, ModeingRelevance, 75 MicH. L REv. 1021, 1035-36 (1977) (analyzing standard of
persuasion for criminal cases in probablistic terms). The adjudicator assesses the social
utility of four possible outcomes: Ug/, the utility of determining that the defendant is guilty
when in fact he is guilty;, Ugt, the utility of determining that the defendant is guilty when in
fact he is innocent; Ury, the utility of determining that the defendant is innocent when in
fact he is guilty;, and 0"n, the utility of determining that the defendant is innocent when in
fact he is innocent. These assessments of social utility can take any values, provided that
Ugy is greater than Ugt and Uit is greater than Ug; as a convention we may assume that Ugi
and Uit, representing accurate findings, are both positive, and Ugt and iy, representing
inaccurate findings, are both negative, but this is not necessary. EUg, the expected value of
a finding that the defendant is guilty, is
(Py x Ugy) + ( - PY) x Ug. (,N)
E4 the expected value of a finding that the defendant is not guilty, is:
(IYx ry) + (1 - PY) x tt. (M2)
EUg is greater than Ei-that is, it is socially preferable that the defendant be found
guilty-if and only if Expression N1 is greater than Expression N2. This is true if and only
-y X (Ugy - NOq + U - eY) X (Ugt - tlt) > 0. (M3)
And simple algebraic manipulation shows that this is true if and only if-
>4 - U1 g (NM)
(1-PY) Ugy - Ur
The left side of Expression N4 equals the odds of guilL The numerator on the right side
represents the difference in social utility between an accurate finding and an inaccurate
one, assuming that the defendant is innocent. In other words, it represents the forgone
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suasion expressed in odds, S. In other words, if the adjudicator con-
cludes that it is x times as bad to convict an innocent person as to
acquit a guilty one, then S = x, and she should convict a defendant
only if the odds of guilt are at least x to 1.
This approach closely tracks Blackstone's celebrated statement
that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer."206 Notice, however, that Blackstone's statement does not pur-
port to assess the tradeoff exactly, but only to set a floor for it. Black-
stone does not say, for example, that it is better to convict one
innocent person than to free eleven guilty people. Blackstone's state-
ment is similar in form to many others made over the centuries, some
of which have set much higher floors than did Blackstone. 20 7 Indeed,
in Schup v. Delo the Supreme Court quoted with apparent approval
the statement by Thomas Starkie, a leading treatise writer of the early
nineteenth century, that "'it is better that ninety-nine... offenders
should escape, than that one innocent man should be
condemned."' 208
It is probably impossible to determine any number that satisfacto-
rily expresses the appropriate criminal standard of persuasion, and in
any event we shall not do so here. But we think the Supreme Court is
clearly correct in perceiving a "'fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free.' 20 9 This perception has led the Court to con-
clude that the "beyond a reasonable-doubt" standard is constitution-
ally required in criminal cases.2 10 Whatever that standard means,21' it
social utility of an inaccurate finding in this situation, or the cost of a false positive. Simi-
larly, the denominator on the right side represents the cost of a false negative.
206 4 WIuIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Actually, Expression (1) in the text
would more closely track a statement that convicting an innocent person is ten times worse
than freeing a guilty one. Assuming, however, that the harm caused by erroneous convic-
tions is additive, at least at low numbers of convictions, this latter statement is equivalent to
Blackstone's.
207 Perhaps nearly everything everyone has ever said on the subject is recorded in Alex-
ander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). This sardonic piece demon-
strates that many people have said many different things on the subject (including some
who have objected to the method of analysis altogether, see id. at 195-97); that Mr. Volokl,
is an extremely clever, industrious, and witty smart Alex; and perhaps not much else. He
does not provide any reason to doubt that the standard of persuasion in a criminal case
must be based on a set of social values under which a false conviction is far worse than a
false acquittal.
208 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting THo. s
STARKIE, EVIDENCE 756 (1824)).
209 Id. (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
210 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
211 Barbara Shapiro gives an historical account of the standard that shows its relation-
ship to developing concepts of probability. See BAR.RAJ. SAPiao, "BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE" at xi-xv (1991).
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"should express our society's view that criminal convictions require, at
the least, a high degree of certainty of guilt."2 1 2
Without attempting to quantify the matter precisely, we will say
that it appears to us-in accordance with the Court's statement in
Schup-that the Blackstone ratio of 10:1 understates the matter. In-
deed, the Starkie ratio of 99:1 appears closer to the mark.213 We base
this assertion largely on the clear differential in social responses be-
tween inaccurate failures to convict and inaccurate convictions. We
know that most criminals escape conviction. Often they are not ap-
prehended, sometimes their cases are not brought to trial because the
evidence seems insufficient, and sometimes they are acquitted at trial.
These are unfortunate failures of the system. Reducing them in signif-
icant number would be a great social good-though far less good
than would have been accomplished by preventing the crime in the
first place. In any event, society in fact tolerates these failures as an
everyday matter. In contrast, there is widespread revulsion when it
becomes apparent that a defendant was convicted and subjected to
serious punishment for a crime he did not commit.2 14 The injunction
of the Hippocratic Oath, "Above all, do no harm," applies to the adju-
dicative system as well as to the medical profession. Convicting a per-
son for a crime he did not commit-perhaps for a crime that never
occurred-is an abhorrent outcome.
The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applies across all
criminal cases, and it would be unwise-as well as unconstitu-
tional215-to select a particular type of crime for a lighter standard.
Even if it were appropriate to do so, it does not appear that child
sexual abuse would be a particularly strong candidate for such treat-
ment compared to other abominable crimes such as murder, rape,
and kidnapping. A false conviction in a child sexual abuse case may
have some particularly nasty consequences, including destruction of a
family21 6 and exposure of the defendant to intense public oppro-
212 Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "ReasonableDoubt"68 N.Y.U. L REv. 979, 981 (1993), cited
with approval in Schiup, 513 U.S. at 325.
213 We do not endorse the standard advocated by Ralph Undewager that "'[i]t is
more desirable that a thousand children in abuse situations are not discovered than it is for
one innocent person to be convicted wTongly.'" Scott Kraft, Carers, Reputations Damaged:
False Molesting Charges Scar Lives of the Accused, LA. TMEs, Feb. 11, 1985, at 1. But note that
Undenvager weighs false convictions against failures to disclose abuse, not against failures
to convict abusers.
214 See, eg., BARiu SCHECK ET AL., ACTuAL INNocE.c_: Five DAs To E.'4EcLmroN A%-D
OTHER DISPATCHEs FROM THE WRONGLY CONVIcrE at x-vi (2000); David Firestone, DNA Test
Brings Freedom, 16 Years After Conviction, N.Y. TLwEs, June 16, 1999, at A22.
215 See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 364, 358 (1970).
216 See Matter of Smith, 509 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1986) ('[A] child abuse
finding against a parent or parents where no abuse has occurred is as harmful and as
devastating to the subyect rhild as is the failure to find child abuse where such has occurred."
(emphasis added)), order affd, 513 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
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brium and even physical danger. A false acquittal is very unfortunate,
but that is true of other terrible crimes as well. The harm caused by a
false acquittal, it must be borne in mind, is not the crime itself but
failure to punish the crime-which, given the uncertain benefits of
punishment, is a significantly different matter. The temptation to ap-
ply a lesser standard of persuasion in child sexual abuse cases is proba-
bly largely attributable to the pressing need to prevent recurrence of
the crime. Of course, recidivism is often a serious possibility with re-
spect to most crimes, and in some circumstances it is not so likely a
possibility with respect to child sexual abuse. But in any event, there
are often other ways to prevent repeated sexual abuse of a child where
the evidence that the suspect has committed abuse is strong but not
sufficient to support a conviction. Supervised custody arrangements
and restraining orders will often be effective and, for better or worse,
the Supreme Court has cleared the path constitutionally for civil com-
mitment where that appears necessary to prevent future abuse.21 7
Two basic points discussed here sometimes seem to get lost in the
analysis of errors of omission and of commission by child witnesses.218
First, false positives are far worse than false negatives. Second, this is
not an idiosyncratic value assessment, but one that has deep roots in
our adjudicative system and that the Supreme Court has adopted as a
matter of constitutional principle.
B. The Probative Value of Evidence
We have seen that the prosecution must satisfy a high standard of
persuasion. Now we present a framework for considering the role that
the child's allegation of sexual abuse may play in the prosecution's
attempt to satisfy that standard. We will show that even small
probabilities that a child would make a false allegation of sexual
abuse, and small misjudgments in assessing that probability, may be
highly significant.
We -will use as a touchstone a simple form of Bayes's Theorem.21 9
The theorem is a basic principle of logic that indicates how to adjust
probability assessments in light of new evidence-which in this con-
text is the child's allegation. This expression combines three basic
components. First is the prior odds of a proposition-that is, the odds as
assessed before receipt of the new evidence. The prior odds take into
217 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
218 Cf Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1018 n.74 (pointing out correctly that the
statement by Saywitz and her colleagues calling risk of error of omission greater than that
of error of commission "implicitly assumes that both kinds of risk are weighed equally"
(referring to Saywitz et al., supra note 49, at 690)).
219 This presentation of Bayes's Theorem borrows from a previous one by one of the
authors. See Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 S-y, L,
REv. 873, 875 (2000).
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account all other evidence in the case. They are, in effect, the starting
point for analysis of the impact of the allegation. The second compo-
nent is the posterior odds of the proposition-that is, the odds that the
proposition is true as assessed after receipt of the new evidence. This
is the ending point, the assessment that we wish to make in light of the
allegation. The third and final component is the lielihood ratio of the
new evidence with respect to the proposition at issue. The ratio is a
fraction. In the simplest form of the ratio, the numerator is the
probability that the evidence would arise if the proposition were true,
and the denominator is the probability that the evidence would arise
if the proposition were false. 220
Bayes's Theorem then posits that the posterior odds of the pro-
position equal the prior odds multiplied by the likelihood ratio.2'
This means that, all other things being equal, the posterior odds will
be higher (a) the higher are the prior odds; (b) the higher is the
numerator of the likelihood ratio; and (c) the lower is the denomina-
tor of the likelihood ratio. Thus, in considering the impact of the new
evidence, we must pay attention to both the numerator and the de-
nominator of the likelihood ratio.
1. The Numerator of the Likelihood Ratio
The numerator of the likelihood ratio in this context is the
probability that the child would make the allegation if it was true. All
other things being equal, the higher this probability is, the higher the
posterior odds will be that the allegation is true. That is, all other
things being equal, the more the making of the allegation is the type
of consequence one would expect to follow from abuse, the more pro-
bative that allegation is that abuse actually occurred.
Lyon devotes much of his article to showing that various factors
inhibit children from making accurate reports of abuse.2 12 We do not
220 What Professors Lyon and Koehler have called the "relevance ratio" in child sexual
abuse cases-the probability of a particular symptom given abuse divided by the
probability of that symptom given nonabuse-is a form of likelihood ratio. Thomas D.
Lyon &Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testi-
mony in Child Seual Abuse Cases, 82 CoRNmEL L REv. 43, 46, 48-49 (1996).
221 The following is a simple proofof this form of Bayes' Theorem. IfEis the evidence
and His the hypothesis in question, then P(E &H) equals P(E) x FHIE) and also P(H)x
P(EIH), where, for example, P(E[ H) means "the probability ofEgiven H. Thus. P(HIE)
P(H) x P(Ei H)P(E). Similarly, P(NHI E) = P(NH) x P(E NH)/P(E) where NH is the nega-
tion of H. Dividing these two equations by each other yields
P(HI E) P(H) P(E IH)
P(NHIE) P(NH) P(EI NH).
The fraction on the left side of this equation is the posterior odds of H. The fiust fraction
on the right side is the prior odds of H, and the second fraction on die right is the likeli-
hood ratio.
222 See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1046-74.
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doubt that this is true. Nor do we deny that in some circumstances
these considerations might make it reasonable to use suggestive ques-
tioning. But what is significant in the present context is that, all other
things being equal, the less probable it is that the child would report abuse if
it occurred, the less probative is a report that she does make. Thus, Lyon's
demonstration diminishes the probative value of a child's report of
abuse.223
Consider simple numerical examples, indicated by the first two
hypothetical cases in Table 1. This table shows what the posterior
odds would be for a variety of hypothetical sets of prior odds and nu-
merator and denominator of the likelihood ratios. There is nothing
particularly significant about these assumed values, which we present
for illustrative purposes only. Case 1 shows that if the prior odds of
guilt are 1:1 (corresponding to a probability of .5), the denominator
of the likelihood ratio is .06, and the numerator is 1 (meaning that it
is certain that if the abuse occurred the child would report it), then
the posterior odds would be about 17:1. That would arguably (under
a Blackstone-like standard) be enough to justify conviction. As Case 2
shows, however, if the numerator is divided in half, to become .5-
meaning that the child is equally likely as not to report abuse-the
posterior odds are also divided in half, and at about 8:1 are presuma-
bly not enough to warrant conviction.
2. The Denominator of the Likelihood Ratio
As just indicated, differences in the numerator of the likelihood
ratio have proportional effects on the posterior odds. The inverse is
true for the denominator: all other things being equal, doubling the
denominator will halve the posterior odds. But the denominator-
the probability that the child would make the allegation even though
it is not true-is presumably much smaller than the numerator; other-
wise the evidence does not have strong probative value. Thus, even a
relatively slight probability that the child would report abuse even
though it did not occur may be highly significant.
The subsequent rows of Table I illustrate this fact. Suppose at
first that there is no evidence against the defendant other than the
child's allegation. In this setting, at least two, and arguably all three,
of the assumptions underlying Case 3 are highly favorable to the pros-
ecution. The first assumption is that the prior odds that the defen-
dant is guilty-assessed without the allegation-are 1 in 100. This
seems unrealistically high, given that there is no evidence of his guilt
223 Of course, reports of abuse are more probable given suggestive questioning, which
is why investigators use suggestive questions. The point still holds, however: even under
suggestive questioning, it is by no means certain that a child who has been abused will tell
the truth.
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apart from the allegation; the vast majority of people are not guilty of
sexual abuse on a given occasion with a particular child, even a family
member.224 The second pro-prosecution assumption is that the nu-
merator of the likelihood ratio is 1; as we have seen, it is almost cer-
tainly substantially less than that because many children fail to report
abuse when it occurs. The third assumption is that the denominator
is only .01, meaning that there is one chance in a hundred that if
abuse did not occur the child would nevertheless allege it. Even if we
rely on the data gathered by Goodman and her colleagues,_ - this esti-
mate seems quite low. Now notice that even given all these assump-
tions, the posterior odds are only 1:1, or even odds. Plainly, they are
not enough for conviction. To reach posterior odds in the Starkie
range226 given the first and second assumptions, Case 4 shows that the
denominator of the likelihood ratio would have to be microscopically
small. In other words, Cases 3 and 4 show that, if the child's statement
is the only substantial evidence indicating that the defendant is guilty,
the fact-finder could justifiably find him guilty only if it concluded
that there was an almost infinitesimally small probability that the child
would make an allegation even though it was false. Information sug-
gesting that this probability, though small, is not that small might
therefore be of great assistance to the fact-finder in avoiding a false
conviction.
TABLE 1
Numerator of the Denominator of the Posterior odds
Prior odds (assessed likelihood ratio likelihood ratio (taking allegation
apart from the (probability of (probability of into account) of
Case allegation) of abuse allegation given allegation given no abuse by defendant
No. by defendant abuse by defendant) abuse by defendant) (col. 1 x col. 2/col. 3)
1 1:1 1 .06 16.67.1
2 1:1 .5 .06 8.33:1
3 1:100 1 .01 1:1
4 1:100 1 .0001 100:1
5 1:2 2/3 .01 33.33:1
6 1:2 2/3 2/36 6:1
7 3:1 2/3 .01 200:1
8 3:1 2/3 2/36 36:1
9 6:1 2/3 .01 400:1
10 6:1 2/3 2/36 72:1
11 6:1 2/3 .25 16:1
224 See Friedman, supra note 219, at 879-83 (discussing the presumption of innocence
in terms of low prior odds of guilt).
225 See, eg., Rudy & Goodman, supra note 69, at 532; Sayvritz et al., supra note 49, at
687.
226 See STAnmE, supra note 208, at 751.
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Case 3 illustrates another point as well. This case posits a highly
reliable witness; she is certain to allege abuse if it happened, and the
probability is only 1 in 100 that she would allege abuse if it did not
happen. And yet the odds that she was abused, given her statement
that she was, are just 1:1. Why are these odds so low? The answer is
that the prior odds were so low. In other words, if the prior odds are
low enough, then even with a reliable witness one might conclude that
witness error is at least as likely as actual abuse to lead to a report of
abuse. Looking at the problem more globally, suppose that many chil-
dren, most of whom have not been abused but a few of whom have,
are asked suggestive questions about abuse. It may be that, even if the
group of nonabused children taken as a whole is reliable, a substantial
number of those who have not been abused will falsely say they have
been.
The remaining cases in Table 1 assume much higher prior odds.
In other words, these cases assume that there is substantial evidence
against the defendant apart from the child's allegation. For the sake
of simplicity, all the cases also assume that the numerator of the likeli-
hood ratio is 2/3. This is very close to the proportion of children in
Saywitz's study (25/36) who, having received an anal touch in a pedi-
atric examination, accurately reported this in response to directed
questioning.227 We hypothesize a set of cases for each of three prior
odds.
In Cases 5 and 6, the prior odds are 1:2, corresponding to a prior
probability of .333. In other words, apart from the child's allegation it
appears plausible, but substantially more likely not true, that the de-
fendant committed the abuse charged. This could be the case, for
example, if there is strong physical evidence that the child has been
abused and, based on the defendant's relationship with her, he is one
of a few likely candidates to have been the perpetrator. Or a fact-
finder could assess those prior odds if the evidence of abuse is weaker
but it is virtually certain that if the child was abused the defendant was
the perpetrator. In this setting, a denominator of .01, as in Case 5,
would mean that the prosecution's proof rather easily satisfies the
Blackstone standard, though it is nowhere near the Starkie standard.
Case 6 assumes a denominator of 2/36. This is the proportion of chil-
dren in the Saywitz study who did not receive an anal touch but who,
in response to directed questioning, inaccurately answered that they
had.228 With this denominator, the prosecution does not even come
close to the Blackstone standard. Note the significance of this case:
There is substantial evidence apart from the child's allegation that the
defendant is guilty, the likelihood ratio is drawn from the Saywitz
227 See Saywitz et al., supra note 49, at 687.
228 See id.
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study, and yet the prosecution clearly does not satisfy its burden of
persuasion.
Cases 7 and 8 use the same denominators as Cases 5 and 6, re-
spectively, but with higher prior odds of 3:1, corresponding to a prior
probability of .75. A case like this could arise if there is both relatively
strong evidence that the child was abused and a strong indication that
the defendant was the abuser. The denominator of .01 now means
that, with the child's allegation, the prosecution's evidence would sat-
isfy even the Starkie standard. With a denominator of 2/36, on the
other hand, the case would satisfy the Blackstone standard but not the
Starkie standard.
Cases 9 through 11 assume prior odds of 6:1, or a prior
probability of 85.7%. Thus, apart from the child's allegation, the evi-
dence of abuse is very strong, but not quite strong enough to justify
conviction under the Blackstone standard. Here, a denominator of
.01 means that, taking the child's allegation into account, the case
would easily satisfy the Starkie standard. A denominator of 2/36
means that the case would not quite satisfy that standard. However,
even with a relatively high denominator of .25, the case would satisfy
the Blackstone standard by a comfortable margin.
Again, it is important to remember that these are merely hypo-
thetical cases. Nonetheless, they vividly illustrate important points.
Given the high standard of persuasion applicable in a criminal case,
even a very low denominator-a very low probability that the child
would make the allegation if it was false-may be high enough to de-
feat the prosecution. And rather small differences in the denomina-
tor may, depending on the circumstances, have great significance.
A corollary is this: If the fact-finder makes a bad judgment of the
denominator, that may significantly increase the chance of an inaccu-
rate factual finding. Consequently, the question becomes how to de-
sign a fact-determination system that minimizes the costs of these
errors.
C. Choice of a Legal Regime
As the previous Section demonstrated, small misjudgments by the
fact-finder may lead to significant errors in applying the standard of
persuasion. Now suppose that a rule maker is choosing between two
rules that differ in at least one respect-evidentiary consequences, for
example-and so may lead the fact-finder to different results. We
need only be concerned with the situation in which one rule leads to
fewer false positives than the other and the second to fewer false nega-
tives, for otherwise the choice between them is immediately obvious, a
"no brainer." Call the rule that yields fewer false positives, and so is
more favorable to the defendant, Rule 1 and the other one, Rule 2.
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Then it becomes rather easy to show that Rule 2 is preferable to Rule
1 only if the number of false negatives avoided by shifting from Rule 1
to Rule 2 divided by the number of false positives created by that shift
is greater than S, the standard of persuasion. Also, recall that S is
equal to Ep/En, the ratio of social cost of a false positive to the social
cost of a false negative-which, we have seen, our legal system treats as
very high.2 29 Thus, switching from Rule 1 to Rule 2 is a good choice
only if the number of false negatives eliminated is far greater than the
number of additional false positives created.
This proposition follows from the same assessment of social value
used in setting the standard of persuasion itself. There is one differ-
ence in application, however. In considering a particular case, a fact-
finder must apply a presumption of innocence, which means in effect
that it must begin the case, before receipt of evidence, with a very low
assessment of the probability that the defendant is guilty.2 3s In choos-
ing between rules, however, a legal rule maker is at least arguably justi-
fied in taking into account the nature of the cases that enter the
adjudicative system. If the defendant is guilty in virtually all of the
229 The expected value of choosing Rule 1 is
[PNO(g) x Ugy + [PI(i(A') x Uiyl + [P]fg(t) x UgtI + [P (i&) x Uit, (N5)
where the Uterms are defined as above, supra note 205, Pl(g& ) is the probability that the
defendant is guilty and will be found guilty under Rule 1, P1(i&y) is the probability that the
defendant is guilty but will be found innocent under Rule 1, and so forth. The four P
terms total 1.
Similarly, the expected value of choosing Rule 2 is
fP2(gy) x U91] + [P2 (, ) x UYI + 1P2g&LA) x Ugtl + [P2(i&t) x OlJ. (N6)
Again, the four P terms (which are different from those in Expression N5) add to 1. More-
over, we will assume that the proportion of defendants who are actually guilty is the same
under Rule 1 as under Rule 2. That is,
P1(gy ) + P1(i-y) = P2(g'y ) + P2A ), (N7)
and
PJ(g + P1(i&t) = P2(gt) + P 2(i&t), (N8)
which means that
P2(g &y) - P(g&) = P(I&Y) - P2(i. &), (N9)
and
P1(9)- P2 (g ) = P2(i&t) - P1(i0&. (N10)
Rule 2 is preferable to Rule 1 only if Expression N6 is greater than Expression N5.
Subtracting Expression N5 from N6, and rearranging in light of Equations N9 and N10,
means that this criterion is satisfied if and only if
[UgY - UiYJ x [PiW&) - P2(i&y)J + [Uit - Ugs1 x PP(I('&) - P2(g&t)l > 0. (Nil)
And this in turn is true if and only if
[P(if ) - P2(i )] > lUit - VgL N
[2(gA) - P1(gt )] [Ugy - U0J.
The numerator of the fraction on the left side of Expression N12 represents the false
negatives prevented by the switch from Rule 1 to Rule 2; the denominator represents the
false positives created by that switch. Notice that the fraction on the right side of Expres-
sion N12 is the same as that on the right side of Expression N4, supra note 205. This is Ep/
En, the social cost, respectively, of a false positive and of a false negative, which we have
said equals S, the standard of persuasion expressed in odds.
230 See Friedman, supra note 219, at 879-81.
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cases entering the system, then the number of false positives, even
under Rule 2, may be so low that the increase in false positives be-
tween Rule 1 and Rule 2 may not be of great concern. This line of
reasoning may be controversial as a guide to a choice of rules, but it
seems reasonable, and we assume it is true for the sake of argument
because it cuts against the main contentions in this Article. It is, in-
deed, a viewpoint that Lyon adopts.231
This consideration may be expressed in a relatively simple expres-
sion. Rule 2 is preferable to Rule 1 if and only if
RxO > S, (2)
where 0 is the odds that the defendant is guilty, assessed without tak-
ing into account the information yielded by Rule 1 or 2, S is the stan-
dard of persuasion, expressed in odds as before, and R is a fraction
defined in the following way: Its numerator is the excess of the
probability, given that a defendant is in fact guilty, that he will be
found innocent under Rule 1 over the comparable probability under
Rule 2. And the denominator of R is the excess of the probability,
given that a defendant is in fact innocent, that he will be found guilty
under Rule 2 over the comparable probability under Rule 1.22
Suppose, for example, that, as compared to Rule 1, Rule 2 raises
the probability that a defendant will be found guilty if in fact he is
guilty by 30%, and the probability that he will be found guilty if in fact
he is innocent by only 10%. Thus, R equals 3:1. If 99% of the defend-
ants who enter the system are in fact guilty, so that 0 is 99:1, then Rule
2 would eliminate nearly 300 false acquittals for every extra false con-
viction created. This satisfies even the Starkie test. But if 90% of the
defendants who enter the system are guilty, so that 0 is 9:1, then Rule
2 would eliminate only twenty-seven false acquittals for every false con-
viction created. And if 70% of the defendants who enter the system
are guilty, so that 0 is 7:3, then Rule 2 saves only seven false acquittals
for every false conviction created, which fails the Blackstone test.
To put it another way, for the pro-prosecution rule to be prefera-
ble, R must be greater than S1O. Of course, it is difficult to know the
231 See Lyon, New Wav, supra note 2, at 1080 ("As the number of truly abused children
among those that researchers interview grows, the percentage of false allegations
decreases.").
232 Begin by rewriting PI(i&y), a term used in Expression N12, supra note 229, as P(y) x
P(iIy). In other words, the probability under Rule 1 that the defendant is guilty in fact
and yet will be found innocent is the probability that he is guilty times the probability
under Rule 1 that, ifguilty he will be found innocent. Similarly, P.(i&,r) - P(y) xPI(ily),
P(g&LA) =P(t) xP(g t), and P2(g&L) =P(L) xP2(g t). Then, bearing in mind that the right
side of Expression N12 equals S, that expression may be rewritten as
P) PI(gft)- P2glt) S. (N13)
The first fraction on the left side is 0, the odds of guilt. The second fraction is R
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odds of guilt with respect to any class of cases. Nonetheless, highly
cited studies by child advocates suggest that O is no greater than about
3:1 across a broad range of cases.2 33 We suspect that 0 is substantially
lower in the class of cases of principal interest in this Article, in which
the child makes the allegation of sexual abuse only after being
prompted by suggestive questioning. In any event, to be conservative,
we will use the 3:1 figure for 0. If the Blackstone standard of 10:1
governs for S, that would mean that R would have to be greater than
3.33:1 for the pro-prosecution rule to be preferable. Thus, if the pro-
prosecution rule increased by 10% the probability that if a defendant
was innocent he would be found guilty, that rule could be justified
only if it increased by at least 33.33% the probability that if a defen-
dant was guilty he would be found guilty. And if instead we apply the
Starkie standard of 99:1, then Rmust be greater than 33:1 for the pro-
prosecution rule to be preferable. This indicates the need for ex-
treme caution before adopting a rule that increases the possibility of
false convictions.
We caution again that there is nothing magical about these nu-
merical examples. They are presented here solely for heuristic pur-
poses. But they do emphasize the fallacy of assuming, when choosing
between legal rules, that all errors are of equal significance.
III
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
This Part now turns to the specifics of how the legal system
should respond to the concerns we have raised.
233 Nancy Thoennes and Patricia Tjaden, in their study of 9000 families in custody
disputes, estimated that 33% of the allegations of child sexual abuse were false. See Nancy
Thoennes & Patricia G. Tjaden, The Extent, Nature, and Validity of Sexual Abuse Allegations in
Custody/Visitation Disputes, 14 CHILD ABusE & NEGLEcr 151, 151, 153 (1990). In a study of
136 cases involving divorce, Faller categorized eighty-nine (65.4%) as involving apparently
true allegations of abuse and thirty-one (22.8%) as involving false or possibly false allega-
tions; as to the remaining sixteen cases (11.8%) she said only that "other dynamics were at
work." Kathleen Coulbourn Faller et al., Research on False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Di-
vorce, 6 APSAC ADvisOR (Fall 1993), at 1, 8-9; see Kathleen Coulbourn Faller, Possible Expla.
nationsfor Child SexualAbuse Allegations in Divorce, 61 AM.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 86, 88 (1991).
Jones and McGraw reviewed the disposition of 576 reported cases of suspected sexual
abuse in Denver during a single year involving children up to age fifteen. David P.H.Jones
&J. Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of SexualAbuse in Children, 2J. INuR.
PERSONAL VIOLENCE 27 (1987). They concluded that 6% were false claims, and they esti-
mated that in an additional 17% of cases, as adult without actually alleging abuse, reported
a suspicion of abuse that turned out to be false, and another 24% were indeterminate. Id.;
see also Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, False Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Children and
Adolescents, 28J. Am. ACAD. ADotsczrNr & CHILD PsvcHiATRY 230, 231 (1989) (using ,analy-
ses of case workers' reports to estimate that 8% of reports of sexual abuse by adolescents,
but only 2% of reports by children under six, are false).
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A. Suggestive Interview Techniques
As Part I of this Article has shown, scientific research demon-
strates that suggestive questioning, including techniques such as
coaching, bribes, and threats, increases the probability that the child
will make an allegation of abuse regardless of whether it actually oc-
curred. If in the end the child would make an allegation, then for two
reasons it is preferable that this occur without suggestive questioning.
First, an unprompted allegation is more powerful, persuasive evidence
than a prompted allegation and therefore more likely to lead to a
conviction if the defendant is in fact guilty.23 4 For this reason, the self-
interest of the investigative and prosecutorial authorities should lead
them to avoid suggestive questions when possible. Second, if the child
does make an unprompted allegation, it is unlikely to result in an in-
accurate conviction, because in most circumstances children are very
unlikely to make a false allegation without suggestive questioning.
It is preferable, therefore, to avoid suggestive questioning until
the child has told all that she is likely to tell without suggestion. But
for at least two reasons we do not believe that investigators should
avoid suggestive questioning altogether. First, the information that
they gain through suggestive questioning may be useful for purposes
other than criminal prosecution-for example, the determination of
custody arrangements or the appropriateness of a restraining order.
Because the governing standard of persuasion is lower in these set-
tings than in criminal prosecutions, information obtained by sugges-
tion is more likely to be decisive than in a criminal setting. Second,
even in criminal prosecutions, an allegation procured by suggestive
questioning may, depending particularly on the strength of the rest of
the case, be decisive in carrying the prosecution's burden of
persuasion.
We recommend, therefore, that investigators avoid suggestive
questions until they are confident that the child has told all she is
234 If the interviewer asks only open-ended questions that contain no suggestion of the
proposition at issue, and the child nevertheless asserts that proposition, a reasonable juror
would probably assess the likelihood ratio of the assertion xith respect to that proposition
as extremely high. It is at least plausible that the child would make the assertion if it were
indeed true, and it is highly unlikely, given the absence of suggestion, that she would make
this particular assertion if it were false. Cf Richard D. Friedman, Route Analsis of Credibility
and Hearsay, 96 YALE UJ. 667, 683-84, 736-39 (1987) (analyzing the "lottery" problem). If,
however, the interviewer merely asserts a proposition and asks the child to confirm or deny
it, then the juror would assign a significantly lower likelihood ratio. That the question is
leading presumably raises the numerator of the likelihood ratio substantially, because the
question focuses the child's attention on the proposition, but this factor also tends to in-
crease the denominator vastly- the denominator is the probability that the child would
assert this particularproposition even though it was false, and because the question focuses
the child's attention on the proposition that probability is presumably far greater than if
the question were open-ended.
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likely to tell without prompting. Interviewers should attempt to limit
repetition of closed (i.e., yes/no) questions within the interview, and
investigative authorities should, to the extent feasible, avoid multiple
interviews with multiple interviewers. Furthermore, interviewers
should adopt categorical rules against the use of techniques that have
been demonstrated to create particularly significant risks that a child
will make a false allegation. Thus, interviewers should not offer re-
wards or other positive reinforcement for favored answers, threaten
punishment or create negative reinforcement for disfavored ones, vil-
ify the accused, or (unless the child has raised the matter first) refer to
statements by the child's peers. Though suggestive questions are
sometimes useful, the use of these techniques is always improper.
There is nothing particularly novel about these recommenda-
tions. Although some interviewers may ignore them in practice, they
are essentially textbook principles, much elaborated in manuals for
interviewers-including one by the National Center for the Prosecu-
tion of Child Abuse, in cooperation with the National District Attor-
ney's Association and the American Prosecutor's Research Institute.235
Interestingly, for all that Lyon and other child advocates contend that
suggestive questioning is often necessary to prompt an accurate state-
ment and that (nevertheless) troublesome questioning does not often
occur in real practice, they do not argue anything different. They do
not, for example, argue that investigators should feel free to ask sug-
gestive questions without restraint.23 6
B. Witness Taint and Competence
In State v. Michaels,237 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that if
the defendant presents "'some evidence' that the [child's] statements
were the product of suggestive or coercive interview techniques," then
the prosecution must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
at a pretrial "taint hearing" that, "considering the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interviews, the statements or testimony
235 See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1378 (NJ. 1994); see also, e.g., DrBR A. PooLE
& MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CAHLDREN: A GUIDE FOR HEIPING PROI-I.
siONALS (1998) (reviewing interview protocol); cf Commonwealth v. LeFave, 714 N.E.2d
805, 811 (Mass. 1999) (summarizing trial testimony of Dr. Daniel Schuman on questioning
techniques to avoid); Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's
Memory and the Law, 40 U. MiAix L. REv. 181, 189 (1985) ("Mild suggestion, such as 'Did
Uncle Harry touch your penis?,' would be less likely to lead to an inaccurate report than a
strong suggestion, such as 'I bet Uncle Harry touched your penis, isn't that right?'").
236 See MYERS, supra note 49, § 1.26, at 62 ("The ultimate goal in forensic interviewing
is to reduce the number of suggestive and mildly leading questions while, at the same time,
respecting the need to ask such questions."); id. § 1.30, at 69 (noting under heading, "In-
terview Practices to Be Avoided" that "i] t is difficult to envision a case in which it would be
proper to ask highly leading questions like 'He touched your vagina, isn't that right?'").
237 642 A.2d 1372 (NJ. 1994).
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[of the child] retain a degree of reliability sufficient to outweigh the
effects of the improper interview techniques."2- 8 If the prosecution
fails to satisfy this burden, then the court must exclude the child's
testimony, as well as her prior statements alleging abuse.2 9
Some courts outside New Jersey have occasionally followed
Michaels in requiring taint hearings,240 but more commonly courts
simply consider these issues in determining the competency of the
child to give testimony.241 For our purposes, the difference is not par-
ticularly significant. Either way, the bottom-line issue is whether the
court should preclude the child from giving live testimony about the
abuse because she has been subjected to a substantial degree of
suggestion.
Although Ceci coauthored the amicus brief that some have
credited with persuading the Michaels court, we agree in general with
Lyon and Myers that children's suggestibility should not usually pre-
vent them from being heard as witnesses, even if the circumstances
indicate that the child was subjected to strong forms of suggestion.24-
We have two basic reasons for reaching this conclusion.
First, a child's statement alleging abuse has significant value in
proving that abuse. Nothing we have said indicates the contrary. Our
argument supports the proposition that the suggestibility of the child
may account for her allegation of abuse in some circumstances. The
allegation itself is not conclusive evidence that abuse occurred. But
the allegation may yet be important, even decisive, evidence, at least
when there is other evidence supporting it. In Bayesian terms, we
have argued that the denominator of the likelihood ratio in some set-
tings is not infinitesimal, and therefore the ratio itself is not enor-
mously high. But we have not argued that the likelihood ratio is no
238 Id. at 1383 (citations omitted).
239 See id. at 1383-85.
240 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Callahan, 9 Mass. L Rptr. 228, 1998 WL 808850, at *1
(Mass. Super. Oct. 19, 1998) (describing prior decision of court); State v. Carol M.D., 948
P.2d 837, 845 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
241 See, e.g., State v. Leak, No. 16424, 1998 WL 184646, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist.
Mar. 27, 1998) (declining to apply the Michaels rule but addressing the same issue through
determination of competency); Fischbach v. State, 1996 WL 145968, at *2 (Del. Mar. 15,
1996) (declining to adopt the formal Michas procedures, under which, once the defen-
dant presents sufficient evidence of reliability, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
reliability by clear and convincing evidence, but holding that "if a itness's statement is
obtained by use of impermissible interviewing techniques [ ] the trial court must deter-
mine whether the statement is reliable after considering the totality of the circumstances");
English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 146 (Wyo. 1999) (expressing agreement ith 'the reason-
ing" of M/dhaes but adopting the holding of the Washington State Supreme Court in In re
Depe'ndeny of A.EP., 956 P.2d 297 (Wash. 1998), that competence inquiry indudes the
question of pretrial taint; discussing varying standards for determining w hether to hold a
competence hearing); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c) (4) (1994) (requiring a showing of "compel-
ling reasons" before a federal court can hold a hearing on competence of child itness).
242 Myers, supra note 88, at 944-45.
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greater than one. Plainly, it is often much greater, even in the face of
significant suggestion.
Second, we believe that the dignity of the child is fostered by al-
lowing her to tell her story first-hand in the proceeding that will re-
solve the truth of her allegation.
Against these considerations, three basic arguments may be made
for excluding the testimony of the child. We will call these the relia-
bility argument, the best evidence argument, and the wrongful con-
duct argument.
According to the reliability argument, on which Michaels principally
depended, if the child has been subjected to significant suggestion,
her testimony may be so unreliable that it should be rejected. We
certainly agree that often the child's testimony may not be reliable in
the sense of being virtually conclusive. Indeed, in some circum-
stances, the testimony may not even be reliable in the weaker sense
that the denominator of the likelihood ratio-the probability that the
child would testify as she has even though the testimony is false-is
very small. But notwithstanding some judicial statements to the con-
trary,2 43 reliability in neither sense is, or should be, the general stan-
dard for the admissibility of live testimony. Rather, the governing
principle is that, at least within broad bounds, the credibility of wit-
nesses is for the jury to determine.
In an earlier age, courts excluded the testimony of many poten-
tial witnesses, including the parties themselves, on the ground that
bias or some other factor would make their testimony unreliable. 44
The modem, vastly preferable view recognizes that such an exclusion-
ary approach has huge costs in loss of valuable information. Cross-
examination, impeachment, rebuttal, and recognition by the fact-
finder of defects of the testimony-sometimes with the assistance of
expert testimony-are the mechanisms that we hope will prevent the
testimony from leading the fact-finder astray. Testimony of the parties
is extremely unreliable, if for no reason other than self-interest, but it
is universally allowed today. Indeed, a criminal defendant has a con-
stitutional right to present his own testimony, even, in at least some
circumstances, if it has been tainted by suggestion.2 45 In general, wit-
nesses who claim firsthand knowledge do not have to pass through a
243 See, e.g., Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380 ("'[R]eliability [is] the linchpin in determining
admissibility' of evidence under a standard of fairness that is required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (alteration in original) (quoting Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977))). Manson itself dealt with identification testimony,
which we address infra note 253 and accompanying text.
244 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 266-80 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 5th ed. 1998).
245 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
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reliability screen, even when testifying against a criminal defendant.2 46
Witnesses with a grudge against the defendant, witnesses whose per-
ception of the events at issue may have been impeded by stress, bad
lighting, or weak eyesight, witnesses with faulty memory, and wit-
nesses who have been offered some inducement (such as a reduction
of sentence) to testify-all these are allowed to testify about what they
assert they perceived, without the court first determining that their
evidence is reliable. Courts should not hold the testimony of children
to a more stringent standard.
A reliability standard for the admissibility of testimony miscon-
ceives the basic theory of evidence. To warrant admissibility, an indi-
vidual item of evidence does not have to point reliably in the direction
the proponent claims. "A brick is not a wall," and every witness need
not hit a home run, in the classic aphorisms.2 47 That is, a single piece
of evidence, including the testimony of a witness, does not have to
support the prosecution's entire case but need only provide one of
the building blocks for the case. Prosecution evidence, not reliable in
itself because there is a substantial probability that it would arise even
if the defendant were innocent, may in conjunction with other evi-
dence make an ovenvhelming case.
The better standard is whether the prejudicial potential of the
evidence outweighs the probative value .248 It must be constantly
borne in mind that the child's testimony that abuse occurred does
have substantial probative value. Even if the child was subjected to
strong forms of suggestion, the child is significantly more likely to tes-
tify to a given proposition if that proposition is true than if it is false,
and no research suggests otherwise. In some cases, that probative
value may be decisive.
What then of prejudice? The principal prejudice concern is that
the jury will overvalue the testimony by so much that the truth-deter-
mination process is benefitted by exclusion. But to our knowledge,
the scientific research provides no indication that juries are likely to
overvalue the testimony of a child to this degree. It may well be that,
especially absent explanation of the research on suggestibility, a jury
would tend to underestimate the probability that the child would
make the allegation if it was false (the denominator of the likelihood
246 A few decisions have set up such screens in the related context of adult itnesses
who claim to have recovered long-repressed memories of abuse or violence. Ste, eg., State
v. Walters, 698 A.2d 1244, 1246.47 (N.H. 1997); State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916, 920
(N.H. 1997).
247 FED. R. Evm. 401 advisory committee's note (quoting McCoR.uc o. EVIDN CE
§ 152 (1st ed. 1954) and citingJudson F. Falknor, Extrinsic PolidesAffcrlingAdmisaility, 10
Ru-rGEis L. Rxv. 574, 576 (1956)).
248 See FED. L Evm. 403 (allowing exclusion where various factors, including prejudice.
substantially outweigh probative value).
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ratio). Such an error would tend to cause the jury to overassess the
probative value of the testimony. It is much more doubtful, however,
that the jury would overassess the probative value to such an extent
that admission of the evidence is worse for the truth-determining pro-
cess than denying the jury access to this information. After all, jurors
are capable of understanding the problem of suggestibility and taking
it into account in assessing the testimony, and experimental evidence
suggests that they do so. 249 Excluding the evidence, which has some
probative value, guarantees that the jury will underassess it. Those
who argue for this result, notwithstanding the usual rule that credibil-
ity is for the jury, should have the burden of demonstrating that the
uncertain prospect ofjury overassessment is significant enough to war-
rant exclusion.250
Moreover, treating a witness as incompetent is a blunderbuss,
which should be used only with great caution. We believe that other
methods can usually limit the danger ofjuror overestimation without
relying on this weapon. Two of these methods are discussed below.
One is expert explanation of suggestibility to educate the fact-finder
as to the vulnerability of the evidence. The other, for extreme cases
only, is judicial refusal to enter judgment of guilt if the child's allega-
tion provides the only substantial evidence pointing to guilt and the
court concludes that there clearly is a significant danger that the alle-
gation was the product of strong suggestion.
We acknowledge that in some contexts, such as coerced confes-
sions and identifications made after official suggestions, courts have
spoken of unreliability of testimony as a factor warranting exclu-
sion.251 We think, however, the argument is generally misplaced, and
that, to the extent exclusion is appropriate in those contexts, it is bet-
terjustified by the two other arguments discussed below.
The best evidence argument does not rely on the proposition that
the evidence is more prejudicial than probative. Rather, it is based on
the "best evidence" principle, the proposition that exclusion of prof-
249 Cf. Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1083 n.419 (reviewing public attitudes regard-
ing the suggestibility of children).
250 It is by no means obvious how to compare prejudice from overevaluation against
probative value. One possibility is to use the ratio of (a) incorrect verdicts of not guilty
prevented by admitting, rather than excluding, the evidence to (b) incorrect verdicts of
guilty caused by that evidentiary decision. Under this approach, if the ratio is greater than
S, the standard of persuasion discussed in Part II, the probative value is greater than die
prejudice from overevaluation. We know of no research currently offering significant assis-
tance in making this assessment.
251 SeeJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964) (holding that the use of involun-
tary confessions is unconstitutional "not only because of the probable unreliability of con-
fessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive," but also because of the sacrifice
of human values created by such coercion and the dangers created by police violation of
the law); infra note 253 (discussing identifications made after suggestion).
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fered evidence is warranted in some settings because it may induce
the creation of better evidence.25 2 To the extent that interviewers-
whether private individuals or government agents associated with the
prosecution-regularly conduct interviews of children with the antici-
pation that prosecutors will use them in abuse cases, the threat of ex-
clusion of the child's testimony for undue suggestiveness may inhibit
them from being so suggestive. We believe that this factor, rather
than concerns about trustworthiness, underlies the doctrine-invoked
often but rarely with success-that in-court eyewitness identification
testimony may be so tainted by prior suggestiveness as to be constitu-
tionally inadmissible.253
This consideration plays a significant role in the realm of child
witnesses. Nevertheless, given the affirmative considerations weighing
in fTavor of admissibility, we do not believe it usually suffices to justify
exclusion of the child's testimony.
252 See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Prindpl 73 IoWA L Rrv. 227 (1983)
(advocating a central rule for the principle in edidentiary law).
253 In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court held that, in the circum-
stances of that case, "[t]he admission of the in-court identifications vuithout first determin-
ing that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent origin vs
constitutional error." ML at 272 (citation omitted). Gilbert was one of a trilogy of cases on
suggestive identification. The same day, in Stoval v. Denno, 388 US. 293 (1967), the Court
held that the rules of Gilbert and of United States v. Made, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which recog-
nized a defendant's constitutional right to have counsel present at post-indictment lineup,
id. at 236-37, did not apply retroactively. StovaU, 388 U.S. at 291. The Stovall Court said:
Wade and Gilbert fashion exclusionary rules to deter law enforcement
authorities from exhibiting an accused to witnesses before trial for identifi-
cation purposes without notice to and in the absence of counsel. A convic-
tion which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage of
justice. The Wade and Gilbert rules are aimed at minimizing that possibility
by preventing the unfairness at the pretrial confrontation that experience
has proved can occur and assuring meaningful examination of the identifi-
cation witness' testimony at trial.
ML at 297. Later, in cutting back on Gilbert, the Court tended to place greater weight on
the question of whether the identification was reliable notwithstanding the suggestiveness.
See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
384 (1968) (requiring suppression of identification testimony only if pretrial procedure
was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepara-
ble misidentification"). In Manson v. Brathwaite. 432 U.S. 98 (1977), the Court said that
"reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." Id.
at 114.
At the same time, however, the Manson Court undercut the significance of untrustwor-
thiness. Assuming the evidence did not fail the Simmons standard, it was for the jury to
weigh. "Ve are content," the Court said, "to rely upon the good sense andjudgment of
American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist
for the jury milL Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the
weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature." Id. Thus the Wad-
Gilbert-Stova/!doctrine has "largely withered on the vine" in the last two decades. Conyers v.
State, 691 A.2d 802, 803 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). Indeed, the law now differs little in
effect from where it stood before the 1967 trilogy. Id. at 804.
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For one thing, many professional interviewers, even those in-
clined to assist the prosecution, may already have considerable incen-
tives not to conduct interviews in an unduly suggestive manner.
Strong suggestiveness, as we have pointed out, is in some circum-
stances counterproductive in that it reduces, rather than increases,
the useful information yielded by the questioning. It also makes the
child's statements less persuasive. Moreover, strong suggestiveness
opens the statements up to attack by defense experts and defense
counsel. In this light, it is not clear that the threat of exclusion will
add very much incremental incentive to avoid undue suggestion.
Furthermore, as we have indicated in Part I, suggestive question-
ing has a proper role in investigations of child abuse, because in some
settings it generates reports of abuse that open-ended questions might
not. Investigations often look not only towards criminal prosecutions
but towards civil proceedings aimed at protecting the child and
others. It may be unfair to the interviewer, and in any event it will
likely chill her investigation, if she is put on a tightrope-one step too
passive, and she may miss a truthful report of abuse; one step too ag-
gressive, and the court will exclude the child's testimony.
A best evidence rule, using the harsh sanction of exclusion of evi-
dence, depends on predictability, which requires that a rule operate
in a crisp, bright-line manner. We have argued that categorical rules
are possible with respect to ploys, such as bribes, threats, ridicule, and
peer pressure, that research has shown to create particularly signifi-
cant risks of false allegations. Generally, however, delicate, fact-based
judgments are more appropriate in this area than bright-line rules.
Interviewers must take the circumstances of the particular case into
account in deciding the degree of suggestiveness appropriate at any
given point in a given interview. The interviewer must balance the
risk of losing information by remaining too open-ended against the
risk of producing false information by being too suggestive.
In short, the best evidence argument may warrant excluding the
child's testimony in extreme cases, in which any reasonable inter-
viewer should know that her questioning was unduly suggestive. We
believe, however, that it would be difficult or impossible to make the
court's decisions both predictable and sensible if they exclude the
child's testimony in less extreme cases.
The wrongful conduct argument contends that the prosecution
should not benefit from evidence that it or those associated with it
secure by acting in a reprehensible way. It thus resembles the argu-
ment made by justice Holmes and others in support of the exclusion-
ary rule for evidence secured by unconstitutional search, that it is "a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
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should play an ignoble parL"2 4 We do not dispute tie principle, but
we believe it has rather narrow application in the realm of child inter-
viewing. When an interviewer recklessly or intentionally follows a
course that raises a significant risk of leading a child to a false memory
of abuse, the interviewer's conduct may be deemed sufficiently wrong-
ful to provide a strong argument for exclusion of the child's testi-
mony. But we do not contend that this degree of irresponsibility
characterizes most interviews, even most highly suggestive ones.
In sum, the arguments for exclusion of the child's testimony have
substantial weight only in extreme cases, and even then only the best
evidence and wrongful conduct arguments carry significant force.
The reliability argument, principally emphasized by Michaels, is unper-
suasive. Thus, in extreme cases, when the interviewing technique vio-
lates clearly established norms or amounts to an intentional or
reckless usurpation of the child's memory-and Midhas appears to
have been such a case2 5-exclusion is justifiable. In other cases, it is
not.
C. Hearsay
Often the child makes an allegation before trial, but does not
testify at all at trial or does not testify to the full substance of the ear-
lier allegation. If the prosecutor offers the prior statement into evi-
dence, the defendant will likely object that it is barred by the rule
against hearsay and by his right under the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution to "be confronted with the witnesses against him."- 6
In recent years, mostjurisdictions have relaxed the application of
the hearsay rule so far as it would exclude out-of-court statements by
children that allege abuse and are offered to prove the abuse. Some
courts have accomplished this end by stretching the limitations on the
hearsay exceptions for excited utterances2 7 and for statements made
254 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), over-
ruled inpart by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), quoted in Stone v Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 525 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255 The Michaels court held that the following factors, present in that case, were "more
than sufficient" tojustify a pretrial taint hearing: "the absence ofspontaneous recall, inter-
viewer bias, repeated leading questions, multiple interviews, incessant questioning, vilifica-
tion of defendant, ongoing contact with peers and references to their statements, and the
use of threats, bribes and cajoling, as well as the failure to videotape or otherwise docu-
ment the initial interview sessions." State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1383 (N.J. 1994).
256 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
257 See, eg., People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1243-44, 1250 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (ap-
proving admissibility of statements made to police after questioning by child's babysitter
and mother), affdyd White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); In re Marriage of Theis, 460
N.E.2d 912, 917 (111. App. Ct. 1984) (admitting evidence of a three-year-old's head nods in
response to specific questions asked by her doctor two months after the alleged event).
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for medical diagnosis or treatment.258 Others have invoked the
residual or "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule now expressed in
Federal Rule of Evidence 807.259 Also, some states have adopted hear-
say exceptions specifically tailored for children of "tender years." 260
Because the Supreme Court has, to a large extent, conformed the
confrontation right to the prevailing law of hearsay, if evidence satis-
fies one of these hearsay exceptions it usually will be deemed to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause as well. 2 61
The Court has repeatedly stated that hearsay law and the confron-
tation right protect "'similar values,"' 2 62 and the principal value per-
ceived is the need to weed out unreliable hearsay evidence from the
reliable. According to the Court, the confrontation right is "primarily
a functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials. '26 3 Thus,
jurisdictions taking a receptive attitude towards hearsay statements by
children alleging abuse against them have done so on the grounds
that the statements are reliable. In the case of a statement made by a
very young child two factors have been particularly influential-first,
the apparent absence of a motive for the child to lie and, second, the
apparent unlikelihood in some settings that the child could develop a
plan to deceive or to concoct her account if it did not in fact reflect
abuse she had actually suffered.264
258 United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1449-51 (10th Cir. 1995) (on remand) (hold.
ing that statements describing earlier abuse made to pediatrician by a girl who was four
years old at time of alleged abuse and five and six years old at time of statements were
admissible under this exception, because the identity of the alleged assailant, the girl's
father, was objectively material to her treatment, her knowledge of materiality being
deemed unnecessary); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 435-39 (8th Cir. 1985) (em-
phasizing emotional and psychological injuries in applying this exception).
259 See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (Ariz. 1987).
260 The progenitor statute is that of Washington. See Wxsa. Rv. CODE ANN,
§ 9A.44.120 (West 2000).
261 See, e.g., TWhite, 502 U.S. at 357-58. In Idaho v. 1Wight, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the
Supreme Court did hold inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause statements by a
young child that the trial court held satisfied the state's version of the residual exception to
the hearsay rule. See id. at 818. The Wright Court did not, however, suggest that the Con-
frontation Clause would bar statements falling within the residual exception, but not
within any other exemption to the hearsay rule. Rather, the Court held that the residual
exception is not a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. Id. Thus, a statement failing within
that exception and no other exemption must be supported by "particular guarantees of
trustworthiness," id. at 828, and the Court held that this standard is satisfied only by "the
totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the
declarant particularly worthy of belief," not by corroborating evidence. Id. at 820. It is an
unresolved question whether "tender years" exceptions such as Washington's will be
deemed to be "firmly rooted" and so to satisfy the Confrontation Clause without a need for
individualized inquiry into trustworthiness.
262 E.g., White, 502 U.S. at 352 (1992) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)).
263 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
264 See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 351 (10th Cir. 1993), re'd on other
grounds, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995). According to the Tenth Circuit:
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The scientific research, however, indicates that in some circum-
stances children's statements are not particularly reliable. Compared
to general hearsay, a statement made by a child who has been sub-
jected to strong forms of suggestion may be notably unreliable."2-
The apparent absence of a motive to lie is of significance only to the
extent the defendant, in attempting to reconcile the fact that the
child made the statement with his theory that the statement is false,
contends that the child lied. The defendant may, however, contend
principally not that the child lied but that suggestive questioning led
her to believe honestly that the assertion was truthful. Similarly, sug-
gestive questioning may make it far more plausible that the child
would state a false account of abuse that one would not otherwise ex-
pect from a young child who was not abused. For obvious ethical rea-
sons, researchers have refrained from trying to inculcate false
memories of abuse; however, there is ample anecdotal evidence that
field interviewers sometimes ply child witnesses with information that
could be construed as indicative of sexual abuse. Some of this infor-
mation, if later incorporated into the child's disclosure, would be con-
sidered outside their realm of knowledge, and so viewed as highly
credible by fact-finders.2 66
Tome implied that A.T. fabricated the allegations about her father because
she wanted to live with her mother. Although this argument does present
some motive to lie, we do not believe that it is a particularly strong one.
Moreover, Tome's contention would require us to believe that A.T.'s state-
ments were the result of a calculated scheme to deceive. Yet Tome has
presented no evidence that the five-year-old A.T. possessed the ability to
appreciate the causal relationships inherent in the conception and imple-
mentation of such a scheme.
I& (citations omitted).
265 See supra Part I.
266 For example, in the Michaels case, the following exchange occurred between a child
witness and an interviewer who gave the child an anatomical doll, a wooden spoon, and a
crayon. See Cxci & BRucR, supra note 11, at 73.
Interviewer. Where else are you hitting [the doll], on the legs?
Child: On the bottom....
Interviewer. Did anything happen back here? [pointing to the doll's buttocks]
(laughter) Huh? (laughter)
Child: She doesn't hurt and do this.
Interviewer- Stick a crayon in her butt?
Child Yeah. (laughter)
Interviewer. Oh, how does that feel. How does a crayon in your butt feel?
Child: (laughter)
Id. Elsewhere in Midcha, an interviewer plies a different child witness with information
relevant to abuse, but the child does not assent to it
Interviewer Did [the defendant] drink the pee pee?
Child: Please that soundsjust crazy. I don't remember about that. Really
don't.
Id. at 73. In State v. Robert Fulton Kelly,Jr., the defendant Bob Kelly had allegedly sodomized
several children, including a three-year-old boy. Id. at 10, 104. At trial, when the boy was
six, the prosecutor committed a rather spectacular error-reversing the roles allegedly
played by the accused and the boy-and yet the child went along vith the suggestion:
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We emphasize two points. First, we are not arguing that all chil-
dren's statements are unreliable. How reliable a statement is depends
on all the circumstances, including-as we have suggested throughout
this Article-the nature of the interviewing process to which the child
has been subjected. For example, sometimes a child, without any
prompting, articulates a detailed and plausible account of abuse soon
after the alleged event and, still without prompting, consistently ad-
heres to that account. In such a situation, the child's statement may
be very reliable.
Second, even if the statement appears unreliable, that does not
necessarily mean that a court should exclude it under an ideal doc-
trine of hearsay and confrontation. Friedman has argued for some
years that the law of hearsay and confrontation is in a most unsatisfac-
tory state.2 67 The chief errors, in his view, lie in conforming the con-
frontation right to the law of hearsay and in perceiving both as based
principally on the need to improve the reliability of evidence. This
conjunction results both in hearsay law that is often overly restrictive
and in a confrontation right that is insufficiently protective of defend-
ants. We do not attempt to develop this argument in full here. But a
system that, according to Friedman, would be far superior to the pre-
sent one could admit many hearsay statements by children without
making the admissibility decision depend on a determination of
reliability.2 68
Prosecutor. Do you remember a time where you ever had to do anything to Mr. Bob's
hiney with your mouth?
Andy: No, Ma'am.
Prosecutor. Do you remember telling Dr. Betty that one time you had to lick Mr.
Bob's hiney? Did that happen? Did you ever have to do that, that you
didn't want to do it?
Andy: Yes, ma'am.
1d. at 104. Absent a record of such suggestive questioning, one might infer that the event
must have occurred, for otherwise the child could not know of such acts.
267 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 IsR. L.
REv. 506 (1997) (arguing that a defendant generally should not be able to invoke the
Confrontation Clause against a statement made by a potential witness-including the vic-
tim-whom the defendant caused to be unable to testify) (hereinafter Friedman, Chutzpa];
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. LJ. 1011 (1998)
(advocating a reconceptualization of the Confrontation Clause); Richard D. Friedman, To-
ward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1992); see
also Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Virginia,
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881) (Friedman coauthor with Margaret A.
Berger and Steven R Shapiro), commented onfavorably in Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140.43 (BreyerJ.,
concurring); The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REv. 200, 244
(1999) (advocating "the sort of reevaluation of the Court's hearsay-based Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence that Justice Breyer imagined in his (Lilly] concurrence").
268 Consider four basic principles that, in Friedman's view, should frame the law in this
area. First, the confrontation right should apply only to a statement that is testimonial in
nature-in essence, one made under circumstances in which a reasonable declarant would
realize that the statement would likely be used to investigate or prosecute a crime. Second,
as to statements to which the right applies, a criminal defendant has a categorical right not
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D. Expert Evidence
Traditionally, courts have been loath to allow expert witnesses to
testify about factors affecting the credibility of percipient witnesses.2 69
Courts were afraid that experts would usurp one of the central func-
tions of the jury, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. In recent
decades, however, courts have been more willing to allow experts to
testify about factors that might affect the credibility of a witness in a
given situation and that might othenvise be insufficiently understood
by ajury.2 7 0 In criminal cases, either the prosecution or the defense
may urge the need for expert testimony. For example, a defendant
may introduce expert testimony on the vulnerabilities of eyewitness
testimony. A prosecutor might introduce expert testimony concern-
ing rape trauma syndrome to help explain the complainant's delay in
making her allegation of rape.
Similarly, in child sexual abuse cases, prosecutors often offer, and
courts often admit, expert evidence to bolster the complainant's cred-
ibility. As Myers has stated,
Courts permit expert testimony [among other reasons] to explain
why sexually abused children delay reporting abuse, why children
recant, why children's descriptions of abuse are sometimes inconsis-
tent, why some abused children are angry, why some children want
to have the statement admitted against him unless he has had an adequate opportunity to
examine the declarant. Third, this right is qualified only by the proposition that the defen-
dant forfeits it if his own wrongful conduct causes his inability to examine the declarant.
Cf. FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (6) (providing for forfeiture of hearsay objection when party
against whom evidence is offered "engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing thatwas intended
to, and did, procure the unavailability of the defendant as a witness"). Fourth, if a state-
ment is not within the scope of the confrontation right, it usually should not be excluded
by hearsay law. RMcHAR D. FwaEDmm, THE Et..tm!rS OF EVIDENcE 327-29, 336-38 (2d ed.
1998).
The interplay of these principles with respect to child declarants could be very com-
plex. But a court might well hold, depending on the circumstances, that the defendant
had forfeited his confrontation right by intimidating the child into silence. Sre State v.
Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1345-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (holding the Confronta-
tion Clause inapplicable because defendant threatened to kill child victim of sexual abuse
if she revealed the abuse). Also, it may be that the confrontation right ought not to apply
to a statement made by a very young child because the child lacks sufficient maturity and
understanding at the time of her statement for the statement to be considered testimonial.
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 267, at 532 n.55. Such lack of maturity and understanding
might also diminish the probative value of the statement, but not necessarily enough to
foreclose admissibility. Friedman has argued:
If a dog's bark has sufficient probative value, we do not exclude it because
the accused has not had a chance to cross-examine the dog. It may be that
the cry for help of a young child, even if verbalized, bears a closer material
resemblance to the dog's bark than to an adult's accusatory declaration.
Id
269 See, eg., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973).
270 See, eg., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); see generally ELm-
BETH F. LoFrus &JANiEs K. Do.LE, Eimvrrnss TESn.%Iohr CVL AND Csu.II.;AL 273-326 (3d
ed. 1997) (describing presentation of expert psychological testimony).
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to live with the person who abused them, why a victim might appear
"emotionally flat" following the assault, [and] why a child might run
away from home .... 271
Myers endorses the use of such testimony, which often fits within the
rubric of child abuse accommodation syndrome, on the ground that
"[t] o the untutored eye of ajuror, such behavior may seem incompati-
ble with allegations of sexual abuse." 272 We agree that such testimony
on behalf of the prosecution is proper at least after the defendant
attacks the child's credibility, and sometimes even before, if the
grounds on which the jury might doubt her credibility are already
apparent.
Often, however, it is the defense in child sexual abuse cases that
wishes to introduce credibility-related expert testimony, usually to
show that the child's statements may have resulted from suggestive
questioning. Many courts have admitted such testimony, 273 but some
courts still exclude it or confine it rather narrowly.2 74 Lyon, while not
expressing any opinion on the frequent use by prosecutors of expert
testimony to bolster a child's credibility once it has been attacked,275
expresses doubt about the need for defense expert testimony on
suggestibility.2 76
We believe that if evidence supports the conclusion that an inter-
viewer subjected the child to a given set of suggestive influences, then
the court should allow the defense to present the testimony of a well-
qualified expert as to the plausible effects of those influences.
The research on suggestibility discussed in this Article gives an
expert ample basis on which to express an opinion that should easily
satisfy the "gatekeeping" scrutiny of the trial court as outlined by
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.277 Indeed, if the "general
271 MYERs, supra note 49, § 5.49, at 561-63 (footnotes omitted); see Mary Ann Mason, A
Judicial Dilemma: Expert Witness Testimony in Child Sex Abuse Cases, 19 J. Psvcmxrar & L. 185
(1991) (reviewing 122 appellate cases in which experts, many of them called by the prose-
cution, testified about the diagnostic uses of anatomical doll play by children suspected of
being abused).
272 MYERs, supra note 49, § 5.49, at 560.
273 See, e.g., State v. Kirschbaum, 535 N.W.2d 462, 466-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (collect-
ing cases in support of the proposition that "[manyjurisdictions also recognize the utility
of expert testimony on the suggestive interview techniques used with a young child and
how suggestive techniques can shape a young child witness's answers," but holding that
trial court acted properly in excluding expert testimony because defendant did not make a
showing of particularized need for the evidence).
274 See, e.g., English v. State, 982 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1999) (noting trial court's exclusion of
expert testimony); United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming the trial
court's limitation on the testimony of the defense expert).
275 See Mason, supra note 271, at 186 (describing testimony of mental health experts
that a particular child fits the profile of a sexually abused child); see also note 271 and
accompanying text (discussing use of experts by prosecutors in child abuse trials).
276 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1083.
277 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
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acceptance" test of Frye v. United States,278 which still prevails in some
states, is sensibly applied, such expert opinion should easily satisfy that
test as well. As Part I of this Article has shown, this research has used
the scientific method of testing, has been extensively subjected to the
rigors of publication and review, and has gained broad acceptance in
its scientific community. Naturally, as in any area of the social sci-
ences (and some of the hard sciences as well), there is not unanimity
on all significant points, and on some points there is a range of inter-
pretations. But a court should not exclude testimony by a qualified
expert reflecting an opinion held by a clear majority, or even by sub-
stantial proportion, of professionals in the field simply because others
hold divergent views. If that were the standard for exclusion, fact-find-
ers would virtually never have the benefit of the experts' knowl-
edge.279 Thus, we find unpersuasive the rather mysterious opinion of
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Rouse, which held that the trial
court had acted within its discretion in allowing the defense expert to
testify on the basis of his own research, but not on the basis of the
research of others.280
The question remains whether, and when, an expert's opinion
may assist the jury sufficiently to warrant admissibility.281 Ultimately,
278 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), supeysded by rue as stated in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
279 Application of a restrictive standard of admissibility for scientific evidence would
probably hurt prosecution of child sexual abuse cases far more than help it. Ste generally
MYRs, supra note 49, §§ 5.11-5.45, at 456-557.
280 According to the court:
The district court -as... well within its discretion in ruling that Dr. Un-
derwager should not embellish his own research and opinions by telling the
jury about the research and writings of other psychologists because these
works have not produced a consistent body of scientific knowledge and
therefore admission of other theories and writings would result in a battle
of experts that could confuse or even mislead the jury.
Rouse, 111 F.3d at 571. Ralph Underwager is one of two veteran defense expert witnesses
whose work Lyon discusses. While acknowledging the "stark contrast7 between cxperts like
Underwager and Richard Gardner on the one hand, and the researchers of the "new wave7
on the other, Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1076-77, Lyon chides Ceci and Bruck for
declining to characterize Undenvager and Gardner as extremists. Id. at 1077 n.398. How-
ever, throwing labels around results in much heat and little light. Underwager and Gard-
ner do hold some views that the research datajustify. As Lyon points out, Ced and Bruck
cited them for the proposition that children are "potentially" less reliable than adults, id.
(internal quotation marks omitted), and also for the proposition that "children are capa-
ble of high levels of accuracy, provided that adults who have access to them do not attempt
to bias their reports." Ced & Bruck, Historical Retieu, supra note 14, at 403 n.l. At the
same time, they hold some views that are not so justified or that are based on norms that
we do not accept. The same can also be said of many experts who tend to consistently
support the credibility of children.
281 See, eg., FED. R. Evm. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized know-ledge
wvill assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or othenvise.").
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this question depends on an assessment of the probative value and
prejudice of the expert evidence. Lyon contends that 'jurors likely
already know" that "children are suggestible."282 This argument may
seem odd, coming near the end of a long article contending that chil-
dren are not as suggestible as some interpretations of the research
indicate. But Lyon's point seems to be that, while children are indeed
suggestible to some degree, jurors do not need expert advice to tell
them that, and such advice may in fact cause jurors to overestimate
substantially the degree of suggestibility. Myers makes a similar point
saying that "some adults" think children are more suggestible than
they actually are.283
One can easily accept the proposition-which Lyon supports with
survey evidence 2 4-that many, even most, potential jurors under-
stand that children are more suggestible than adults, and yet recog-
nize the value of expert evidence. Two points are fairly obvious. First,
the same surveys reveal that a substantial number of jurors probably
do not recognize this suggestibility differential. 285 Second, recogniz-
ing that children are suggestible, or more suggestible than adults, says
little about magnitude-how suggestible they are. Perhaps more fun-
damentally, this Article has shown that the suggestibility of children is
not a one-dimensional matter that can be summarized adequately by
saying that children are [pick your adjective] suggestible. How plausi-
bly a given child might have alleged abuse even if the abuse did not
282 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1083.
283 MYERs, supra note 49, § 5.7, at 449 ("Although young children are suggestible, they
are not as suggestible as some adults believe." (footnote omitted)).
284 Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1083 n.419.
285 One of the surveys cited by Lyon actually indicates rather clearly that jurors are
substantially less likely than experts to regard eight-year-old children as suggestible, A.
Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. TressillainJones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Mat-
ter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WiTNEss EVIDENCE: RECENT PSYCHOLOcicAL P. RSACti
AND NEv PERSPECTVES 13, 33, 35 tbl.2.15 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford
eds., 1983). According to another of the surveys cited by Lyon, 15% of respondents as-
serted that children aged five to nine are less suggestible than adults when the influence
agent is an adult, and 8% believed that children are about as suggestible. Michael R.
Leippe & Ann Romanczyk, Children on the Witness Stand: A Communication/Persuasion Analy-
sis ofJurors'Reactions to Child Witnesses, in CmLDREN'S EvrrNm.ss MmoRv 155, 159 & tbl.9.1
(Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1987). Moreover, 35% believed that children are generally
more consistent in action and conversation, and 23% believed that children are about as
consistent as adults. Id. The third survey cited by Lyon showed that college students
tended on average to rate children as more suggestible than adults, but the data as re-
ported do not indicate whether a substantial number of the respondents felt otherwise.
David F. Ross et al., Age Stereotypes, Communication Modality, and Mock Jurors'Pereptions of the
Child Witness, in PERSPEcrVES ON CHILDPmN's TEsTnMONy 37, 38 (S.J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989).
The authors went on to conduct an experiment, reported in the same paper, in which they
presented respondents with a mock trial transcript. They were surprised to find that the
mock jurors found eight-year-old witnesses no more manipulable by either prosecutors or
defense lawyers than were either twenty-one-year-old or seventy-four-year-old adults. Id. at
46 tbl.3.2.
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occur depends on the particular situation, including the extent and
nature of the suggestive influences to which the child was subjected.
There is no reason to assume that the average potential juror, much
less the overwhelming majority ofjurors, has a good understanding of
all the insights that decades of psychological research have yielded.
Consider, for example, the effects of repeated questions and the plau-
sibility of children making false statements about physical events that
would be of central concern to them. 28 6
Furthermore, there is little reason to assume that expert evidence
on this subject will be unduly prejudicial. There is no plausible basis
for believing that allowing the defense to present expert testimony will
bias the jury in favor of the defendant, in the sense of making the jury
impose an inappropriately high standard of persuasion on the prose-
cution. 28 7 The danger to which Lyon seems to be pointing is the pos-
sibility that the jury will give excessive weight to the expert's testimony
of suggestiveness. But there appears to be no sound basis for conclud-
ing that this danger is real-and that the jury will not only overvalue
the expert's testimony but will do it so much that the testimony will be
substantially more prejudicial than probative. Juries have convicted
defendants in many cases in the face of expert testimony on suggesti-
bility presented by the defense. 28s
In assessing the danger of ovenaluation, it is important to bear in
mind a major theme of this Article (and for that matter of Lyon's):
the degree of a child's testimony is extremely dependent on the par-
ticular circumstances of the case. Thus, if the defense expert is per-
forming her function properly, she will testify only to suggestive
influences that the jury could reasonably conclude, on the basis of all
the circumstances, were present in the case. For example, if there is
no basis for concluding that the child was threatened with negative
consequences for failure to describe abuse,2 8 9 then research on the
286 Readers can ask themselves the following questions: vill nearly all typical jurors
appreciate that preschoolers are disproportionately likely to change their answers to yes/
no questions (e.g., "Did he touch you there?") when asked such questions repeatedly
within the same interview? And will nearly all jurors likely (a) appreciate the myriad of
factors that increase the reliability of children's statements (e.g., spontaneity), and then
(b) apply them to the case in question?
287 That is, it does not appear plausible that ajuror, on hearing the expert testimony
concerning suggestibility, will apply an improperly increased standard of persuasion be-
cause the child appears less worthy of protection or because (for any prescribed assessment
of the probability of guilt) the defendant appears to be a more symrpathetic figure.
288 Commonwealth v. LeFave, 714 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Mass. 1999) ("The defendant
presented evidence at her trial tending to show that the child witnesses' testimony was
unreliable as a result of improper interviewing techniques. The jury nevertheless believed
the child witnesses, despite evidence of the use of improper interviewing techniques and
the opinions of the defendant's experts.").
289 We speak of a basis for drawing the conclusion, rather than of evidence supporting
the conclusion, for two reasons. First, in some circumstances, a court may deem conduct
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effects of such threats would be irrelevant to the case and should not
be included in the expert's testimony.2 90 If the defense expert does
not exercise self-restraint, the court can ensure that her testimony
does not stray beyond the case at hand.
And, of course, the prosecution is not toothless. The prosecutor
may cross-examine the defense expert. In doing so the prosecutor
should attempt to expose any overgeneralizations that the expert has
made or any dubious assumptions on which the materiality of her evi-
dence depends. Moreover, as stated previously, if the defense im-
peaches the child's testimony, whether by expert testimony or
otherwise, the court should allow the prosecution to present its own
expert testimony supporting the child's credibility.2 91 Likewise, this
testimony should be limited to the issues made material by the setting
of the case-specifically, to the grounds raised explicitly or implicitly
by the defense for being skeptical of the child, or to those that would
likely appear plausible to the jury even absent the defense's conten-
tion. In short, the adversarial system, through the use of cross-exami-
nation and rebuttal witnesses, is resilient and can adequately expose
the weaknesses of expert opinions offered by either side.
by the prosecution or investigative agents to have obstructed the presentation of such evi-
dence. Most significantly, a court may deem a failure to videotape a formal interview held
for investigative purposes improper conduct, supporting an inference that some highly
suggestive influences were used. Second, the jury does not come into the courtroom as a
blank slate-it is entitled to use its knowledge of the world. See, e.g., John H. Mansfield,
Jury Notic4 74 GEo. L.J. 395, 395-96 (1985). Thus, if the case arises in the context of a
particularly acrimonious divorce, an expert may be allowed to testify as to the effects of
suggestive parental questioning even absent proof that the child was exposed to such ques-
tioning: the hostility of the accusing parent to the defendant parent may be enough to fill
the gap.
290 Similarly, we agree with Lyon that, because of the number and nature of suggestive
techniques used in the Monkey Thief study, that study should not be the basis for expert
testimony in most actual cases. Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1039.
But Lyon further claims that Ceci and Bruck advised experts "that they should learn
very little about the case (save the child's age) to remain impartial," id. at 1027 (citing CucI
& BRucK, supra note 11, at 276 n.1). However, Lyon's characterization is misleading. Ceci
and Bruck counseled experts "to remain uninvolved in the court proceedings and in the
personal lives of the defendants." CECI & BRucK, supra note 11, at 276. Thus, "[e]xperts
who plan to review the scientific literature should learn only enough about the case to assure
that their testimony is relevanL" Id. (emphasis added). Ceci and Bruck therefore said that
when they have testified they have asked that the attorney who sought their testimony "not
describe any but the most global case details... (e.g., age of child)." Id. at 276 n.1 (empha-
sis added). But this did not mean that Ceci and Bruck thought it improper to learn about
the techniques actually used. In fact, Lyon quotes Bruck as saying that before testifying in
one case she asked the defense attorney for "some material on the interviewing procedures
used with the children so that I could be sure that the suggestibility of young children was a
key issue in this case." Lyon, New Wave supra note 2, at 1027 n.115 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Cf id. (quoting Bruck "as respond[ing] negatively to the
prosecutor's question [on cross-examination] as to whether she had done 'any work on
this case in terms of looking at the techniques used.'" (citation omitted)).
291 See supra text accompanying note 272.
THE SUGGESTIBIiTY OF CHILDREN
There does not seem to be any substantial reason to assume that
jurors will tend systematically to overvalue defense expert evidence
significantly but undervalue prosecution expert evidence-and to do
so by enough to warrant exclusion. Some jurors may be confused by
the "battle of the experts," of course, and some might unthindngly
treat conflicting expert evidence as a wash, which they can safely ig-
nore. But these are always potential problems when expert witnesses
contest each other, whatever the subject. Such problems do not jus-
tify insisting that the fact-finder make decisions of enormous impor-
tance on the basis of intuition, uninformed by the insights that
decades of scientific research have to offer.
E. Videotaping Interviews
The issue of videotaping interviews with a child witness has gener-
ated much discussion.292 Myers has ably summarized many of the fac-
tors for and against videotaping.293 On the positive side of the ledger
Myers notes that videotaping gives an interviewer incentive to use
proper techniques and preserves a record of such use.2-94 Perhaps be-
cause he is writing from the vantage point of the interviewer, Myer
does not mention another equally important argument: if the inter-
viewer does use suggestive techniques, the videotape will reveal it.
This Article has emphasized that the degree to which a child's suggest-
ibility accounts for her allegation of abuse depends very largely on the
extent and nature of the suggestive influences to which she has been
subjected. If all interviews with the child are videotaped, it will sub-
stantially reduce, and in some cases effectively eliminate, uncertainty
on this score. An interviewer's notes are an unsatisfactory alterna-
tive:29 5 if historical accuracy is the goal, there is no substitute for elec-
tronically recording interviews.
292 See, &g., Catherine Stephenson, Vdcotaping and How It IIods Well in San Diego, 7J.
IN-na, soxAL. VioLNcE 284, 284 (1992) (videotaping "enhances prosecution efforts and
serves the best interests of the child"); Paul Stem, Videotaping Child Interviews:. A Detriment to
an Accurate Determination of Guil, 7J. I pm.so A. ViOL.Exc 278 (1992).
293 MvaRs, supra note 49, § 1.33, at 85-96.
294 IM., § 1.33, at 86-87. He also points out that videotaping may reduce the need for
multiple interviews, in part because expert witnesses may be able to Niew the tape rather
than interview the child. Id, § 1.33, at 85. Also, it preserves the child's statement, includ-
ing her "emotion, demeanor, and body language," which might make the statement better
evidence if it is admissible. Id. It may also discourage recantation and may persuade the
non-offending parent that abuse occurred. Id., § 1.33, at 87. Additionally, it may en-
courage confession or negotiation of a plea by the defendant and may refresh the child's
recollection. Id, § 1.33, at 87-88. Of course, showing the child the %ideotape some time
later after she has failed to tell the same story is in itself highly suggestive.
295 Accuracy is a problem. Note in this context a study conducted by Bruck, Ceci, and
Francoeur in which mothers asked to take careful notes on what their children told them
about a surprise event were later highly inaccurate in recounting their children's disclo-
sures. See Maggie Bruck et al., The Accuracy of Mothers' Memories of Conenations Ith Their
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Of course, informal communications with the child, such as by
her parents or teachers, will not ordinarily be videotaped.2 96 These
informal communications are often significant sources of suggestion.
Similarly, though it might be feasible for a therapist to tape sessions
with a child if there is suspicion of abuse, taping therapy sessions as a
matter of course would probably be inappropriate. 297 Moreover, even
if therapy sessions could be appropriately recorded, the patient-psy-
chotherapist relationship is privileged, 298 which would probably pre-
clude evidentiary use of the tape. Thus, in many cases, a practice of
videotaping investigative interviews does not eliminate all serious
questions of suggestiveness. But the intractability of some aspects of
the problem is a weak argument against mitigating the problem where
that is possible. Videotaping considerably narrows the problem of de-
termining the extent of suggestive influences to which the child is sub-
jected, and that is a great benefit.
The arguments on the other side of the ledger are, once again,
based in large part on the fear that the jury will overvalue the evidence
in favor of the defense. 299 And once again, we believe that keeping
potentially useful information away from the jury is an inappropriate
means of ensuring that the jurors will not place too much weight on
it. The prosecution has ample opportunity, through the interviewer
and expert witnesses, to counter any argument raised by the defense.
Judge Posner has argued that the sheer length of interviews leaves an
unattractive choice between presenting hours of tape to the jury and
risking distortion through editing.300 But this concern is present
whenever a significant amount of evidence is scattered throughout a
much larger amount of minimally probative chaff. In practice, we
Preschool Children, 5 J. EXPEIUMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPUED 89, 102-03 (1999); see also Lucy S.
McGough, For the Record Wrdeotaping Investigative Interviews, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 370,
376-77 (1995) ("[Tihe meaning of an out-of-court encounter can turn on many subtleties
of behavior and expression .... When no record has been made of the investigative
interview, an accurate reconstruction of it is a formidable and perhaps impossible task.").
Furthermore, note-taking is more distracting than videotaping. In re R.M. Children,
627 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871, 873 (Fain. Ct. 1995) (noting that interviewer declined to audi-
orecord interview, and concluding that note-taking is far more distracting); see MEas,
supra note 49, § 1.33, at 96 (noting that many children forget the camera, and it can be
hidden behind one-way glass).
296 MwRs, supra note 49, § 1.33, at 95-96.
297 Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Slurely [a therapist's]
clients would be shocked if he had a routine practice of videotaping therapy sessions with
child victims of sexual abuse."); MYERs, supra note 49, § 1.33, at 96.
298 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
299 Myers discusses the possibilities that videotaping will place exaggerated emphasis
on inconsistencies in the child's descriptions of abuse and that defense counsel will take
portions of the tape out of context or exaggerate interviewer error. MvmPs, supra note 49,
§ 1.33, at 88-95. To prevent release of videotaped interviews to the media, he proposes a
protective order. Id. § 1.33, at 96-97.
300 See Nelson, 874 F.2d at 1229.
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may expect each side to select the excerpts it feels presents its case in
the most favorable light and to present evidence and arguments mini-
mizing the importance of the excerpts used by the other side. The
court has authority to restrain the parties if the process consumes too
much trial time in relation to the probative value of the evidence.
Thus, in accord with most professionals in this field,301 we believe
that it is good practice for official interviewers to videotape interviews
conducted with children during an investigation or prosecution of
suspected child abuse.30 2 Moreover, we believe that, absent exigent
circumstances, interviewers should be required as a matter of law to
tape such interviews. This is the standard practice in many jurisdic-
tions, and there is no reason why it should not be made mandatory.3 0 3
In jurisdictions where taping is not required as a matter of law,
courts may nevertheless craft evidentiary rules based on a "best evi-
dence" principle that give interviewers strong incentives to follow the
practice. The most stringent of these rules would exclude the child's
statements, or even her testimony, if the interviews were not taped
(again, and throughout this discussion, absent exigent circum-
stances). This rule, although harsh on its face, would quickly amount
in effect merely to an almost absolute requirement of taping.3 0' Offi-
cials would quickly learn that it is easier to tape than to invite exclu-
sion of evidence, and as a result, very little evidence would actually be
301 Myers summarizes the results of pilot projects in California as follous: "ideotaping
appeared to have no deleterious effect on investigation or prosecution. A large majority of
prosecutors, police officers, and social workers involved in the pilot projects were enthusi-
astic about videotaping, stating that videotaping improves investigation and reduces
trauma for children." MAyEns, supra note 49, § 1.33, at 84-85 (footnote omitted); see also
McGough, supra note 294, at 385 ("Pretrial videotaping of child witness's accounts is surely
an idea whose time has come.").
302 See In re P.M. Children, 627 NY.S.2d 869, 873 (Family CL 1995) ("As a matter of
sound interviewing methodology, nearly all experts agree that' pretrial interviews of al-
leged child sex abuse victims should be recorded to reduce the danger that the children's
recollection is tainted by suggestive questioning." (quoting State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d
1372, 1379 n.1 (N.J. 1994))).
303 See McGough, supra note 295, at 379 ("[S]tate legislatures may decide to require
videotaping of investigative interviews with children, despite the lack of a constitutional
imperative."). Lyon contends that "many jurisdictions require videotaping or taping of
investigatory interviews," Lyon, New Wave, supra note 2, at 1026, but we are uncertain that
this is technically correct. Certainly numerous states encourage the use ofvideotaping by
making videotaped statements taken under prescribed procedures admissible evidence in
some circumstances, see McGough, supra note 295, at 380 & n.43 (listing statutes), and the
practice has been followed as a matter of standard protocol in some foreign jurisdictions
for years. Id. at 380.
304 In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Supreme Court refused to impose an
absolute rule that the admission of statements made by the child during an untaped inter-
view violates the defendant's confrontation right. See id. at 818-19. We agree that such a
rule ought not be imposed as a matter of national constitutional law, and in any event, the
Confrontation Clause would probably be the wrong vehicle for such a rule. But that does
not mean that courts should decline to impose a rule inducing taping as a matter of their
own evidentdary law.
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excluded. A somewhat softer rule, followed by some courts, makes the
failure to videotape the interview a significant factor in determining
admissibility of the child's statements or testimony.305 Other varia-
tions would seek to impose the costs of failure to videotape the inter-
view on the prosecution, but without relying on exclusion. Thus,
given the failure to record, a defense expert could be allowed to testify
as to the potential effect of all suggestive influences to which the child
may have been subjected. The court might also instruct the jury that
the interviewer failed to follow proper practice and that the jury
should take the failure into account in evaluating the possibility that
the child's statement or testimony was the product of suggestion.
F. Guidance and Control of the Jury
Finally, we come to the end of a trial. Judges in criminal cases in
federal court, and in some otherjurisdictions, are free to comment to
the jury on the weight of the evidence, including factors bearing on
the credibility of witnesses.30 6 Thus, if a witness is a drug or alcohol
abuser, or a former accomplice of the defendant, or if she has re-
ceived or hopes to receive favorable treatment in return for her testi-
mony, the judge may comment on how these factors affect her
credibility.307 Similarly, judges often comment generally about factors
that are believed to affect the credibility of eyewitnesses.308
Suppose, then, that a child testifies or makes an admissible out-of-
court statement alleging abuse, and evidence supports the conclusions
that she was previously subjected to highly suggestive influences. The
question arises whether the judge should comment on these influ-
ences as potentially affecting her credibility. In most cases, we do not
believe that any judicial comment-either supporting or adverse to
the child's credibility-is necessary. We believe it usually suffices if
the court affords the parties adequate opportunities to present expert
evidence on the likely impact of these influences.30 9 In an egregious
case involving highly suggestive influences, some judicial comment
might be appropriate.
305 See, e.g., State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1230 (Idaho 1989), affd 497 U.S. 805
(1990); In re RM. Children, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
306 See KEVIN F. O'MALLY r AL., FEDERALJURY PRACrICE ANt INSTRUCrIONS § 11.06, at
89 (5th ed. 2000). But see id. (stating "[t ] he wisdom of such comments, however, is greatly
suspect," because of the difficulty of commenting equitably).
307 See id. § 15.03-.05.
308 See id. § 15.01.
309 For various forms of instruction given with respect to child witnesses, see id.
§ 15.13. The principal theme of most of these instructions is that the credibility of a child
should be determined in the same manner as that of any other witness, and that age is only
one factor to be considered. At least three federal courts of appeal-the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits-recommend that, because the general standards apply, no special in-
struction should be given. Id. § 15.13, at 451 (2000 & Supp. 2000).
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Along with the power to comment on the credibility of witnesses,
a trial court also has the authority in a criminal case to refuse to enter
judgment on a verdict of guilt, and to remit the prosecution to a new
trial, if it is persuaded that the verdict is contrary to the great weight
of the evidence. In making this determination, the court is free to
consider the credibility of witnesses.310 Therefore, an accused might
argue that a child's statement or testimony is so tainted by suggestion
that a verdict of guilty cannot stand. We believe that this argument
should usually, but not always, fail.
Suppose that the case is marked by two factors. First, apart from
the child's testimony or prior statements, the prosecution has insub-
stantial evidence as to at least one element of the charge, most likely
to the fact of abuse. Second, the child was subjected to highly sugges-
tive influences. As Part II has shown, the first factor means that the
prosecution must rely heavily on the child's allegation. Indeed, the
allegation must carry the prosecution's case the very large distance
from the presumption of innocence to the constitutionally mandated
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And, as discussed in
Part II, the court might conclude, on the basis of the second factor,
that the denominator of the likelihood ratio-the probability that the
child would make the allegation even though it is false-cannot reason-
ably be perceived as minuscule. Putting these two considerations to-
gether, the court might well conclude that ajury could not reasonably
find that the prosecution satisfied its standard of persuasion.311
If prosecutors select cases appropriately, cases with both these
features will be rare. The judicial power to reject a verdict, even if
usually kept in reserve, can be a powerful force ensuring that prosecu-
tors do indeed make careful selections.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have summarized some of the research on the
suggestibility of children. The research reveals that the degree to
which children are suggestible depends to a large extent on how in-
vestigators conduct interviews. It also indicates that abuse investiga-
3LO SeeTibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 38 n.11 (1982); United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d
1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
311 A court has the raw power to enter an outrightjudgment of acquittal on the basis
of doubts about the credibility of the witness. Such an order, even if illegitimate, is effec-
tively unreviewable. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 14243 (1962). We have
concentrated on a new trial order because, although it lacks the finality of an outright
judgment of acquittal, it is dearly legitimate. An alternative xay to achieve finality, with a
greater veneer of legitimacy than ajudgment of acquittal based on doubts about credibil-
ity, would be for the court to reconsider its ruling admitting the child's testimony or prior
statement and then hold that there is insufficient evidence to support a coniction. The
manipulativeness of this approach diminishes its attractiveness.
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tions are often conducted in such a way as to enhance the dangers of
suggestibility. We have offered an analytic framework for considering
legal implications of the research findings and have presented a set of
policy recommendations that we believe are consonant with those
findings. These recommendations are, we believe, even-handed, re-
flecting a bias for neither the prosecution nor the defense. The proof
of our even-handedness may be that we have exposed ourselves to a
two-flank attack. Prosecutors may complain about our recommenda-
tions that in some circumstances children's statements regarding
abuse should be regarded as unreliable for hearsay purposes, that
courts should often be receptive to expert evidence emphasizing the
suggestibility of children, that videotaping of interviews should be
mandatory, and that occasionally the weakness of a child's statement
or testimony should cause the court to refuse to enter a judgment of
guilt. Defense lawyers on the other hand, are likely to complain about
our recommendation that, in all but egregious cases, the child should
not be rendered incompetent to testify because she was exposed to
strongly suggestive interviewing techniques.
We suspect that scholars who have recently challenged the legal
significance of the psychological research emphasizing children's sug-
gestibility are not motivated principally by antipathy to policy propos-
als such as the ones we have presented. Rather, we suspect that they
are concerned about a matter of mood. In an earlier day, children's
statements were often not taken seriously. As a result, child sexual
abuse was under-reported and under-prosecuted. Thus, there is a
concern that scientific research emphasizing that children are suggest-
ible will be taken for more than it is worth and lead us back to perva-
sive and unwarranted devaluation of children's statements and
testimony.
We recognize this concern. But we balk at any approach that
makes it more difficult to recognize, and thus mitigate, problems in
the way children alleging abuse are interviewed. And we confess that
we do have a bias of an intellectual sort, which underlies our predilec-
tion in favor of allowing both the child and experts to testify. Accu-
rate fact-finding, we believe, is not best achieved by trying to maintain
and regulate the fact-finders' ignorance. The best cure for possible
misunderstanding is not to keep an area in darkness, but rather to
bathe it in light.
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